Selected techniques of corporate acquisition, 1964 by Ashe, Ammon Vincent (Author)
SELECTED TECHNIQUES OF CORPORATE ACQUISITION
A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTT OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITT
IN PARTIAL FULFILI21ENT FOR THE REQUIREMENTS










At a crisis in louth he taught me
the wisdom of choice t To try and fail is
at least to learn; to fail to try is to





The writer wishes to express his appreciation
for the guidance given by Mrs. Johnnie Lee Clark
and Dr. Harding B. Young in the preparation of this








LIST OF TABLES ▼
ChapterI.THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER . . 1
The Rights of Stockholders
The Stockholder in Management: Fact vs. Fiction
II. SELECTED TECHNIQUES OF COIPORATE ACQUISITION 21
Basic Right of Stockholders
Elimination of Present Directors
Sue the Directors
Relinquish One's Stock
III. THE CHANGING ROLE OF MANAGEMENT 66







!• Distribution of Family Income Relative to Individual
Shareowners 10
2* Distribution of Stock Ownership Relative to Income
Groups 12
3. Distribution of Stock Ownership Relative to Educational
Attainment ........ ......... 13
li. Distribution of Age Relative to Stock Ownership ... . 13




The Righta of StockholdersA3 the owner of the corporation, the
stockholder has certain legal rights, either common law, statutory, or con¬
tractual* In the XQOst general terms, these rights may be classified as
(a) collective rights and (b) general rights.
Collective rlgM^s of stockholders (applicable only by a vote of the
stockholders) •
1* To amend the character with the approval of the state
of Incorporation.
2. To adopt and to amend the by-laws, subject to any
right of the director to do so.
3* To call and to hold meetings*
U* To elect directors*
5* To authorizet tlu sale of permanent assets, merger,
consolidation, other major Intercorporate fusion,
reorganization, dissolution*'*'
General rights of the stockholder (applicable either collectively
or Individually)*
1* To receive and to hold a stock certificate when the
stock is fhlly paid.
2* To transfer stock at will.
Bigh Babb and Charles Martin, Business Law (New fork: Barnes 8t
Noble, Inc*, 1955)« p* 16*
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3* To be notified to stockholder's meetings.
U. To Tote at stockholder's meetings.
5* To receive dividends when and if declared.
6. To subscribe to nes stock, if issued, in proportion
to the amount of stock held.
7. To inspect the corporate books and records.
8. To arrest ultra rires acts of the corporation.
9. One behalf of the corporation, to resist and to
defend the corporate interests against the injurious
or Inequitative acts of a majority or a minority.10.To share in the residual assets, if any, upon
dissolution.^
Voting for Directors .—Three general systems of voting are avail¬
able:
1. Common law voting allows one voting for each stockholder regard¬
less of the nujober of shares be holds. This is now obsolete and practi¬
cally extinct.
2. Statutory voting allows one vote for each share of stock held.
Under this system the holder or holders of a majority of the shares out¬
standing can elect all the directors.
3. Cumulative voting allows one vote for each share held times the
nuidb^ of directors to be elected. Under this system a person holding a
majority of the shares outstanding may be able to elect only a majority of
the directors. Thus, under cumulative voting, a minority group may be
able to obtain representation on the board.
Stockholders are not permitted to ctimulate their votes unless
J. C. Baker, Directors and Their Function (Cambridge, Hass.i
Harvard University Press, 19k^), p. 21.
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provision has been made for such procedure. Such provision may be had, if
at all, in the state constitution, statutes, charter, or by-laws, depend¬
ing on the state of incorporation.
Proxies.—tfoast proxies are written broadly so as to include all
natters that c<»ae before the meeting. It is doubtful, however, that a
proxy holder is able to vote on natters of extraordinary ii^ortance, such
as a merger of dissolution unless there are specifically Included. In
fact, under the new rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission strict
requirements are applied to the contents and solicitation of proxies.
Unless a proxy is coupled with an interest, it is always revocable
until its vote has been cast.
It should be noted that a fiduciary cannot delegate his authority.
Consequently an execution, administrator, or trustee caimot vote by dis¬
cretionary proxy unless the instrument creating his office has specifi¬
cally given him that permit or unless the statute so provide. He may, how¬
ever, give a directed proxy.
Inspection of Corporate Books and Records.—Concerning this right,
a general restriction appliest the stockholders* examination must be at
a "reasonable" time and place, and his examination must be for a "proper"
purpose. As to purpose, however, we may note the foUoiring statutory
variatioziss
1. Some states make no requirement as to purpose, nor do th^
specify that examination cannot be made for an iiqproper purpose.
2. Courts differ as to whether, under such a no-provlsion statute,
the stockholder is entitled to make an examination for an iBqproper purpose.
u
3* In some states the statutes grant the right of examination to
anyone regardless of whether he is a stockholder or not* This is chleny
for the benefit of creditors*
U* Seme states require that the stockholder own a certain percentage
of the outstanding stock (generally 7$ to and must have been a stock¬
holder for a certain period of time*
5* ITnless the statues limit or qualify the stockhold^s* right to
examine^ he still holds his common-law rights t that he may examine at a
•reasonable" time and place for a "p3X>per" purpose.
6* If the stockholder has the right of examination^ he may bring
his attorn«^j accountant, or other person or persons to aid him in inter¬
pretation or collection of data, or he may delegate the entire examination
to them or to his agents*^
The Stockholder in Management.—During the month of May, 19U7, the
Mew York Stock Exchange splurged with heaty advertising in Time* Look, The
Saturday Evening Post, and other magazines* The advertisement showed a
table covered with hats; the denim cap of the railroad fireman, the white
cap of the house painter; the derby of the stock-brol»r; the hoiid>urg; the
widebrimmed straw of the farmer; the dashing cap of an airman aM a fur
neclq>iece to represent the women*
The title is "Stockholders' Meeting." The advertisement says "They
came from everywhere, from every income group, from every comtminity* They
are women as well as men; employees as well as executives; farmers as well
I
Lillian Davis, Modem Corporate Reports to Stockholders, Employees,
and the Public (New York: Prentice-Hall, Ihc., 19U^), p* 31*
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as businessmen. Thej are typical stockholders the owners of American busi¬
ness.*^ And it might be added, a more ineffective bunch of Americans you
never did see.
The advertisement, of course, wanted to conv^ just the opposite
in^ression. Corporations are owned by everyone. Wall Street is not a
rich man's preserve. It is a place where Main Street U.S.A. as well as
Park Avenue puts its savings, where the millions of the millionaire and
the tens and twenties of the widow and the schoolteacher commingle. And
the stockholders' meeting, to which the owners of a corporation go to vote
on its affairs, is the social leveler. An owner is an owner, even as at the
polls a voter is a voter once the curtain on the booth closes.
The inqplication is that stockholders have something to say about
their business. When they go to the meetings, the management sits up.
Actually, I shall endeavor to show in this analysis, that management is
only as polite and attentive as it wants to be.
Once, in the days of small companies, the owner and the manager of
a business were one and the same. The stockholder controlled the affairs
of the company because he was the management. In theory and tradition, he
is still the boss. In theory, he provides the capital and he hires the
management. And managers of giant corporations are willing to preserve the
fiction — it is a convenience.
The fact is that the stockholder hires nobody. He la the hireling—
or at least his money is.
In the days of the advertisement, when the Stock Exchange suffered
^ime Magazine. March 17, 19U7, p* 83*
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from a sad case of giantism, L. 0« Ho<^er, statistician and letter writer
of W* E. Hatton & Co., reflected what Wall Street believed and wanted to
believe when he wrote in the New York Exchange's magazine. The Exchange,
the following: "No accurate census has ever been taken, but the various ex>
pex^s who have studied the matter are agreed that between 1$ million and 16
million Americans own stocks - approximately one person out of nine and
about one family out of three. Hooper was under the influence of announce¬
ments by two New York Stock Exchange presidents, Charles R. Gay and Emil
Schram, and they, in their way, were under his influence, too. All three
were interested in emphasizing the scope and breadth of stock ownership.
It became mutual hypnosis.
Keith Funston, who succeeded Schram as president of the Exchange,
asked the Brookings Institution to find the facts. Brookings selected Lewis
H. Kimmel, a research economist, for the task. Eimmel came forth with an
estimate of 6,1;90,0CX) shareowners in 1952.
At first. Wall Street was shocked and shrunken. But then a new
thought struck: only 6,500,(XX) people owned stock! 1^, we haven't begun
to tap the market! The 6,500,000 estimate became a new credo, a road to
expansion, a promise to salesmen. "It is a basis for the New York Stock
Exchange Monthly Investment Plan which permits people to btiy stocks for as
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little as $1:0.00 eveiry three months."
The number of shareowners increased steadily. "By 1956, the total
was 8.6 millioz^s; by 1959, 12.5 million. By 1962, according to the Stock
Lewis H. Kinmel, Share Ownership in the United States (Washington,
D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1952), p. 13.
^Ibid., p. 20.
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Exchangers latest study, the nunber of Individual shareowners in the United
States had reached an iJB^>resslTe 17 sdlllon."^ Klmmel's estiaate has be>
come ancient histoiy and Hopper's e^^ansire thinking a reality*
Millions of person who never dreamed of buying common stocks when
Eimmel made his study vere induced by the long, postwar bull market to try
their fortunes in Vail Street* "They vere converted to stock by fear of
Inflation, by hope of profit, by vigorous sales efforts and, in many cases,
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by opportunities to buy shares via eoi^pany payroll deduction plans** But
nothing pulls people into the stock market like the stock market Itself —
vhen prices rise*
The soar in stock ownership in recent years is also closely related
to postwar prosperity*
As family income increased, the capacity for invest¬
ment income in common stocks also increased* It is no sur¬
prise to find that in addition to stock, 86 per cent of all
shareholders also have savings accounts, 87 per cent have
life insurance, 77 per cent own their own hcaoes, and $6 per
cent own n*S* Government Savings bonds*3
They are persons who know and accept the risks Involved in stock ownership*
They seem to know what they are doing — as ijovestors*
let as a political force, these stockholders have never measured up
to their statistics* "Congressional mail from stockholders seldom is vol¬
uminous enough to support the well-reasoned briefs of high priced lower
It
Manhattan law firms** That is why demands for changes in the cspital gain




^)avid Kair, Fight for Control (New Torkt Ballantine Books, 1956),
p* Uo*
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tax and the eliminating of "double taxation of dividends" have made alow
progress in Congress*
The question is then raised^ wbQr is that? "Seventeen million indi¬
vidual shareowners are a lot of people -- almost four times the number of
farmers in this countrj and more than the membership of the AFL^IO."^
Moreover, shareowners are financially influential people* In political
campaigns, they are much more likely to be disbursers of lafgesserto both
Republican and Democratic office seekers than workers or farmers* let, as
stockholders, th^ do not wield as much influence as labor or farm organi¬
zation* Again, wby?
Stockholders are not a bloc or a group* They &re an aggregate*
They lack homogeneity of purpose* Farmers have a common interest* They
are all in the same business — raising crops and livestock* They want
high prices for what th^ sell, low prices for what they buy* When it
comes to putting pressure on senators and representatives in Washington,
D* C*, they speak the sane language, though livestock, cotton, or wheat or
tobacco farmers may differ in the details and the enq>hase8«
Similarly, with a union, members have a common objective; higher
wages and strong bargaining pcwer vis-a-vis enployers* They may not vote
as their labor leaders advice them* But, they will vote as their economic
interests dictate* This makes for a large block of votes* Workers, like
farm^s, wil defend their common livelihood*
Not so with stockholders* Those hats in the Stock Exchange adver¬
tisement are a confession of weakness* Stocks provide supplementary income
^id*. p. 51
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to salaries, fees, or vages* Dividends are not, exc^t In rare eases, a
stockholder's main income* For every Lewis D* Gilbert, who is willing to
make a career of being a professional stockholder by guarding his own and
other stockholders' Interests, there are thousands of stockholders who are
merely dividend collectors* They are "stockholders" only when director
omit a dividend* Th^ they wonder why it had to heqppen to th^, ponder
what to do about it, realize they can do little and pass on to other
matters* Occasionally, a stockholder will write to the coB^any even as
an inate reader will write a letter to the editor* Shareholders are not
stockholders* Th^ are something else instead*
Stockholders are not indifferent to stock market fluctuations* The
ups and downs of prices in Wall Street are a measure of wealth — and this,
for many persons, is a source of price, and perhaps gloat* But most stock¬
holders are Indifferent to corporations*
The persons who get along in this world, who make a success of their
business or their profession, are more interested in their own work, in
what has made them a success, than in policing corporation executives and
safeguarding his legal rights as a stockholder* That implies that persons
who have much at stake as stockholders are no more inclined to be legally
exercised about it than are those with more modest holdings*
Anyone would accept as self-evident that stock ownership
would follow the income curve upward. But Kimmel wanted to
establish this fact* In effect, he sorted the hats* And he
found more wearers of homburgs, derbies, and fedoras among
shareholders than wearers of white or striped denim caps*^
In 19$2, Klmmels' study showed that more than 6$% of all shareownlng
^Lewis H* Kimmel, Share Ownership in the United States (Washington,
D. C*i The Brookings Institution, 1952), p* 13*
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families had laccaaes of ^5*000 or more*
The foUoiarlng table shows the results of the findingst
TABI£ 1















In a later surrey, the New lork Stock Exchange found much the same
pattern, but headlined the statistics to substantiate its pet phrase "people's
capitalism," as followst "Two-thirds of homeowners earn under $7*500 or al-
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most half the shareowner are in the $5*000 to $10*000 income range."
Such assertions are factual. But they can also be misleadli^. Th^
&Bpba.a±ze breadth of ownership and disregard depth of ownership. A small¬
town garage mechanic with an income of $5*000 a year may own 10 shares of
a $10.00 stock in contrast, let us say* with a lawyer in a large city where
income is $50*000 a year and who owes hundred share lots of many stocks.
Each rates equally in the statistics as one shareowners, yet the lawyer is
more important to the co]l^)anies as a stockholder and to the brokers as a
customer.
Ve call the American ecoiumiic system a capitalistic system. let, for
Lewis H. Eimmel, Share Ownership in the Ifaited States (Washington*




the people at large, it is a consumeristlc society, a high standard>of«
living society. "The tendency of persons in the lower and rising income
brackets is to save by spending to purchase hc^es, autos, home furnishings,
on time."^ Our great corporations thrive on this propersity to spend.
"Each year we build the best car we possibly can to satisfy the customer,"
said Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. when he was chairman of Qeneral Motors, "and then
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the next year we build another to make him dissatisfied."
Families with leftover income-uncommitted income are the purchasers
of common stocks. They are the better-heeled families. An early saii^>le
surv^ by'the Ford Motor Coa^any of its shareholders supports this. "Only
11 per cent of the Ford hold^s reported Incomes of less than $^,000} only
31 per cent reported Incomes of less than $7,500. In other words 69 per
cent had incomes of $7,500 or more. Four out of five purchasers of Ford
3
stock (82 per cent) were already stockowners." Yet, here was a security
originally tabbed for the man in overalls.
The conclusion is that as people ascend the income ladder, the like¬
lihood that some of their savings will spill over into the stock market in¬
creases. The data taken by the New York Stock Exchange in 1962 makes this
point with great clarity. Table 2, page 12, iidicates stock ownership
according to income groups.
As a corollary, and as one would expect, the incidence of stock
^Labor Department, Statistics of Income (Washington, D. C.: Govern¬
ment Printing Office, 1958), p. 13»
^"Portrait" life Magazine. June 12, 1952, p. 22.
%ew York Stock Exchange, Stockholder Data (New York, New York, 1962).
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oimership tiq>roves -with education. Persons irith college training develop
higher earning power than those who have not had such advantages — not
because they go to college but because they have what it takes to go to
colleges brainsj energy, persistence. (Hany of a non-college graduate al¬
so has these attributes and energes as well-off stockholder eventually).
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTIOB OF STOCK OWNEHSHCP
RELATIVE TO INCOME GROUP
Reported Household
Income
Per Cent of Total in Each
















Moreover, college men and women are likely to come from middle and
upper income families. These would be families with stock owning bias. "The
Stock Excha33ge's 1962 survey shows that 6l per cent of college graduates are
stockbwners versus only 5.2 per coat of those who did not graduate frcan high
2
school. * Table 3, below, shows stock ownership according to educational
attainment.
Finally, a close relationship exists between age and stock ownership.
Toong people starting a career and a family do not earn wages or salaries
sufficient to put aside funds for tbs purchase of common stocks. As they
Securities and Exchange Coamission, Survey of Stock Ownership (New




DISTHIBDTION OF STOCK OUNEBSHIP RELATIVE
TO EDUCATIONAL ATTABDlENr
Per Cent of Each Group
Education Vho are Shareowners
k jeara or sore of college ••••••• 60«9
1-3 years of college 3U«2
U years of high school IS^S^
1-3 years of high school ...«••• 5*2'^
grow older, or they become more experienced in their work, their earning
power increases* Likewise, they have purchased their initial homestake —
heds, washing machines, refrigerators, automobiles, homes, and so forth*
If they are of a provident turn, they have extra susney* They can put it in
insurance, savings bonds, savings institutions, or common stocks* The cor¬
relation between age and stock ownership is illustrated by 1962 New lork
Stock Exchange data*
TABLE
DISTRIBUTION OF AGE RELATIVE TO
STOCK OWNERSHIP
Age












So the pattezn of the typical shareholder emerges* He tends to be




financially* And it is not too hard to guess which occupational group are
nost heavily committed to stocks* Th^ are the vell^ guess the business
executive*
The Stock Exchange's study shows that roughly 1 out of 3 in profes¬
sional and managerial occupations own some stock* The executive is in the
high salary bracket* Further^ he is not afraid of camnon stocks. HLs own
cGD^)any is likely to be a stock corporation* He undoubtedly owns some of
its stock* He may even have been given special iiicentives to purchase it
through stock option plans* He has, in his business life, been brought vp
with stocks and finance* High income and a big propeirty state in society
are reciprocal* The high income helps to acquire property and property
abets income*
Similarly, the professional person — the lawyer, engineer, doctor,
dentist, architect — is a likely stockholder* This is an upper and middle
incixne group* Earnings would be well above a comfortable subsistence* So,
there would be leftover Income available for Investment and these are per¬
sons who by association become investment conscious* Engineers, lawyers,
architects deal directly with business men and some are business men*
Doctors and dentists often have business men as patients*
Next come white-collar workers and salesmen* . Then comes the largest
single numerical group of stockholders — amounting to 3U % of the total —
housewives* Nonemployed housewives is the technical designator* But this
is, in part, an arithmetical exaggeration* Many women are shareholders in
name only* Stock may be owned jointly with husbands or registered in the
wife's name for tax purposes* And it is the man of the house who has the
say* He btjys the stock and decides when to sell it* Only the unusual
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housewife reads the r^orts, studies the statistics^ cashes the dividend
checks, and sends in proxies* In most homes, that is man's work* Still,
facts are facts, and nearly one out of evexy six housewives has stock in
her name*
Retired men also are high up as stockholders •»> 1$ out of every 100*
And then come fir^nen and craftmen —- one out of ten* The following t«d>le
illustrates the facts:
TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATION REUTIVE
TO STOCK OWNERSHIP
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wlnclude architests, lawyers, engine^s (and perhaps a few
doctors and dentists) who are business executives*
The very dispersion of stock ownership is a partial esqplanation of
the ineffectiveness of stockholders as stockholders* When doctors — stock¬
holders get together, they are far more apt to talk about operations in the
incidence of cancer due to cigarette smoking, than about stock market or
^Securities and Exchange Commission, Occupational Distribution of
Stock Ownership (New York, New York, 1962), p* ^1*
X6
corporate policy* Housewife — stockholder will be more Interested In
souffles and garbage disposals than In the movement toward corporate dmno-
cracy* Few shareholders^ regardless of the hats they wear^ have sufficient
amounts at stake to devote much time to the con^anles In which their money
Is Invested.
A comparatively small group of persons, those In the
$10,000 and»up Income group and the 'and-up* must be em¬
phasized - has a major stake In common stocks. The Stock
Exchange's own summary shows that 36^ of the shareholders
are to be found In the upper segment of the population.
Those with Incomes of $10,000 and more.^
The Survey Research Center of Michigan notes that "most share-owners
have a relatively small stake la American corporations. About hi per cent
of stock owning families estimate their stocks at less than $1,000. An-
other U per cent between $1,000 and $5,000." At the other extreme, less
than 2 per cent of all families have stockholdings worth more than $25^000
and at least 6U per cent of the stockholdings are In the possession of small
proportion of families with more than $10,000 In income.
Although the Michigan data are subject to normal sait^ling errors their
conclusion Is unassailable; out of 17,000,000 Individual shareowners, a
small percentage control the bulk of all shares. These are not likely to
be militant sharehold^s - guardians of the rights and the prerogatives of
the stockholder with a capital S, which really means the small stockholder.
These are not likely to be openly and positively dissatisfied with the
corporate manner and morals of a social order in which they oa bhe top
Social Science Research Center, Share Ownership (Ann Arbor, Michigan:
University of Michigan Press, i960), p.
^Ibid., p. 56.
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of the ladder economically* Nor are they likely to have time for corporate
democracy in capital letters*
American society is an active society. Recognition and prestige
come from doing and not from having*
John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and his sons have become syidbols of Ameri¬
can achievement - not because of tbier financial legacy, but because of
their character - what they have done and are doing with their money and
themselves. Noteworthy are the Rockefeller Center in New York and the
Judicious management of the Rockefeller Foondation.
&nry Ford II is already far better known than his father, Edsel,
because of his achievement in resurrecting the Ford Motor Con^any from an
"also-ran” in the automobile industry. It is notable that the Rockefellers
and the Ford brothers are all in Who*8 Who, that Tommy Manville, another
scion of great wealth, who had devoted his life to wedding show-girls is
not. In America, a man's work, not his dividends or dolls, distinguishes
him.
So it is with stockholders. The large shareholders are apt to be
executives. In any case, they direct the policies of the ecmqpanies. In
word and indeed they represent the managerial group, not the stockholder
group, or officers, th^ may be anxious to have liberal stock option plans
for executives. These tend to dilute the equity of the great man of share¬
holders. Or, being large shareholders and not needing dividends, they may
want to plow back most of earnings into growth, into developed* Small
shareholders, especially retired people, probably would be anxious to have
substantial pay-outs for living expenses.
Id
Economle self-interest does not create a large earnest "stockholder
class" in America. "In 19^8, out of ^,126^0(X> taxpayers vho reported
diridend income, at least Ui600,000 or 90 per cent had salaries, Wages,
and other income in excess of dividends."^ At the most, $26,000 families
2
might have drived as much as $0 per cent of their income £tom stocks.
The great majority counted on salaries or wages to keep the installi&ent
collector away from the door.
The 10 per cent of the population which might derive a major pro¬
portion of inc(Me from dividends can be divided into two groups which are
as follows:
1. The majority, often retired persons, whose dividend income
doesnH have to be exceptionally large to equal or exceed receipts from
pensions. Interest, and part-time work. Often their total income from all
sources will be less than $$,000 annually.
2. The minority, the really well-to-do only in the cases of large
scale property owners, persons with Incomes in excess of $100,000 annually,
does dividend consistently equal or exceed other income. If you^ throw in
the $$0,000 to $100,000 income recipients, whose dividend receipts don't
usually equal income from other sources, you will still add only 79^376
taxpayers.
And these $$0,000 and up recipients are often owners, or large sbareholders,
or managers of corporations.
To many of them, their success as business men is more rewarding
^labor Department, Statistics of Income (Washington, D. G.* Govern¬
ment Printing Office, 1958), p. $7.
^id.
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than guarding their legal rights as stockholders. They are professional
business men, professional Mecutiyes^ professional behind the scenes
policymakers. They are seldom professional stockholders.
Many of the retired persons, including vidoes who deriye a major por¬
tion of their income from diyidends, mould like to be professional stock¬
holders. They hare the financial incentive to be corporate match-dogs.
But horn many of the persons in this group mould be competent guardians of
their rights?
A fern mho had been corporation officials mould knom horn to analyze
stock - option and pension plans for executives, and complicated financial
statements. Th^ mould be able to ask Intelligent questions at annual
meetings of stockholders. Bnrever, by deJ^nition, by having been execu¬
tives, th^ mould probably be an^ly provided for in retirement. They
might even have consulting salaries from the corporation. They mould not
be goaded by financial necessity to ehsperon the officers of corporations
in mhich th^ owned stock. Presumably, in retirement, they mould prefer
travel, golf, and good books to stockholders Imbroglles. Moreover, they
mould identify mith the management group, not mith the opponeuts or the
critics.
That leaves the lower-income pensioners those mho have been success¬
ful, but not outstandingly successful, financially, those mho may be getting
by in their old age comfortably but not luxuriously. Obviously, they mould
be handicapped as corporate matchdogs. Retired doctors, farmers, mechanics,
or engineers cannot suddenly become conversant mith finance. Their activi¬
ties have been in different channels. And, by the time they have reached
20
the age of retirement, thej are hardly endowed with the energy demanded by
a new career - notwithstanding their mon^»
That is why stockholders, as stockholders, are inarticulate indio
vidually and ineffectire as a group. The big stockholders are usually in
the managerial group protecting their personal interests. The ndddleslzed
shareholders are preoccupied with their careers, and the retired persons
are too old to develop into effective champions of their own rights. So,
in administering his property, in exercising his legal prerogatives, the
average stockholders today is in the position of a depositor in a bank.
If he does not like what is going on > he can get out. The depositor does
it by taking out his mon^; the stockholder - by selling his stock.
In selling his stock, the shareholder abandons his opportunity to
improve management. He "includes himself out." He passes on to someone
else a stock certificate he regards as faulty, something he does not want.
In which case, the only check on the management is the threat that the
price of the stock will decline and some intruder • may buy up the shares
at a depreciated price and try to take over the company. If no such
"raider" comes along, the average stockholder is left holding the bag of
managers, that Vail Street says are not very good.
Stockholders, for the most part, are doctors, lawyers, executives,
schoolteachers, farmers, air pilots, and house painters first; and stock¬
holders second. They are Investors, who, for the most part, do not wish
to be bothered - except the dividends.
ciaPTEa n
SELECTED TECHNIQUES OF COBFOUTE ilCQUISITION
The Three Basic Rights«-«When the dividend on stock is reduced or
stops, when the stock drops sharply in price - the stockholder vill sudden¬
ly take an interest in what is happening to his investnent - be becomes
conscious of being an ownn*. He wants to do somethiDg. His property, his
wealth, is in danger. He wonders - what are my rights?
If he were to consult a lawyer, he would find out he has quite a few
rights depending in part upon the state in which the eoBq)aiy is incorporated.
He has the right to share in the company's profits, providing the directors
see fit to declare dividends. He has the right to elect directors. & has
the right to receive annual reports of the coa^any's earnings. He has the
right to hold directors responsible for their acts-by lawsuit, if he wants
to go that far. He also has the right to inspect the books of the corpora¬
tion, to vote on mergers and consolidations, changes in the charter, and
changes in the by-laws. In some states, he has first rights — preemptive
rights — to buy new securities.
By the time the lawyer gets through, the stockholder realises he
is not lacking in rights. But if he is a small stockholder he is likely
to find out that his rights are not exactly power. He will find out that
rights mean different things to different stockholders.
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To Ecbert E. loung, who took over the $2,000,000,CKX) Nev lark central
railroad in 19$h in a nationfd.de progqr fight^ his rights as a stockholder
were the means to get coni^ol oi a cos^anj'* To stockhold^s who follow
Clarence H, Venner, who siade a modest fortune in ''unsettlLi^ the nerres"
and plans of giant corporation in the earljr 1900*a, rights are something to
he asserted in lawsuits* To banks, insurance coispanies, mutual funds, and
similar institutions, rights are a check on management and a means to infor¬
mation* Aod to a militant such as Leid-S Gilbert, stockholder's powers are
the legal powers bj which the independent stockholder holds corporation
officers and directors accountable to their boss, the stockholder*
But the average Joe and Jane stockholders, the Whereares" and legal
trappings water down to three primary rights that he or she can exercise*
They are as follows:
1* The right to vote the officers and directors, the management,
out of the corporation by electing new directors - that will take a proxy
fight* This was Young's way in the New York Central and that was what Louis
E. Wolfson tried in 1955 with Montgomery Ward and Company*
2* The right to sue officers and directors for misuse of power,
gross management, and dishonesty* This was Clarence Venner's way but often¬
times he was accused of acting iu>t for stockholders but for himself*
3* The right to sell his stock which means throwing himself out*
He resigns frcM the company*
What power accrues to stockholders as a result of these rights,
practically and legally, which may be manifested as a means of taking over
a corporation?
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Essentially^ the first basic right-the right to rote-provides the
basis for action on the part of the stockholder. This action may take any
of the following forms t 1. elimination of the present board of directors,
2. suit against the present directors, and 3* relinquishing one's own hold¬
ings for a substantial consideration.
These techniq;ae8 will be delivered as used by several businessmen
in corporate takeovers in subsequent paragraphs.
Elimination of Present Directors.—
Through the instrumentality of the ballot, stockholders
have effective control over management. They use this
power in the election of directors and in voting upon
other iaqportant issues placed before them. If manage¬
ment is unsatisfactory, they have the means to remove
it. Where the raa^jority of stockholders are pleased iflth
the results, they indicate their confidence by the re-
election of the nominees vhom management recommends to
them for the directorate.^
The preceding statement is credited to Haarry A. Bullis, vho, for many
years, was highly successful president and then chairman of General Mills,
Inc. It is a typical statement of a eoxporate ^ecutive. It idealizes the
stockholder. It has limited pertinence to reality.
It would be realistic if stockholders took an active interest in their
coB^anies; if they had the capacity and energy to evaluate the performance
of corporate management intelligently and critically; if they read carefully
the pro:£y material sent to them. Mr. Bullis, himself, notes that some share¬
holders resent the spending of money for the purpose of keeping them in¬
formed.
Substantial professional investors - e.g. the banks, investment trusts.
^Stanley W» Drucher, Corporate Democracy, A Ccmg>ilation of Dictla
(Charlottesville, Virginia* tJniversity of Virginia Press, 19^8}, pp.
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insurance coB^anles, and irell-to~do individuals or trustee •> have the power
to remove officers and directors* They do understand the issues* They
actively analyze the eajrnings of companies in which they have investments*
The small stockholder, however, is in a s^arate lot* As the
Temporary National Economic Committee of Congress pointed out in 19li.O un¬
less there is a powerful nucleus of some sort, it is practically impossible
for the hundreds of thousands of scattered holders of a majority of stock
of a giant corporation to get together even by proxy in order to etxercise a
degree of control* Moreover, the individual stockholder does not know the
merits of those who contend for the control of the directorate; he has
little or none of the materials which enable him to Judge the results* Earn¬
ings may be good or bad also because of the con^etence of the officers; but
may be good or bad also because of the good or bad conditions of business
in general*
Thus the small stockholder is not in a position to act decisively
or even to know how to act* So long as he receives satisfactory dividends
or at least convincing reasons why such returns are not forthcoming the
av^age stockholder will return proxy certificates to the existing manage¬
ment* Dividends are the main stream of interest, so long as they are satis¬
factory* That is why the ballot,as an instrument of control, is fictional*
The right to vote in coi^orate affairs is not identical with the right to
vote in politics* The right to vote implies an opposition* In politics,
somebody is alwsys rea(^ and anxious to "throw the rascals out*" But in
corporate affairs, this right is usually latent* The small stockholder has
to be offered a choice of candidates to exercise his right to change the
managem^t* Occasionally, but not often, he gets a choice, as in the New
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York Central fight. But such opportunities to "throw the directors out"
require special and tmusual circumstance in individuals plus money.
Robert R. Young had an ambition to control an eastern railroad. He
had become head of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company in 1938 when he
took over control of the Alleghany Corporation^ top holding co]i$)any in the
disintegrating Van Sweringen ei^ire. But he wanted still a bigger stake.
He used the Chesapeake and Ohio funds to buy 800,000 shares of the New York
Central's stock. Later, he arranged for the sale of the Central stock to
two friends, the oil rich Clint V. Murchison and Sid VT. Richardson of Texas.
Young had more than anibition. & was a millionnaire in his own right.
He was chairman of the Allegheqy Corporation, where assets exceeded $50,000,
000 and he spent $1,308,000 of his own and Allegheny funds to win proxies.
Clearly, such a struggle is above the financial compentence of the school*
teacher, or doctor, or farmer who owns ten or fifty, or one hundred shares
of stock in a cospany.
The struggle for econ(m>ic pow^ in a big company is far more costly
than the struggle for a seat in the U.S. Senate. In the 1952 canqpaign,
the highest outlay officially reported was that of the late John F. Kennedy,
Democrat from Massachusetts, $23U,000 of which $16,000 represented his own
expenditures and $218,000 esqpenditures of others in his behalf. His defeated
opponent, Henzy Cabot Lodge, Jr., used funds «• his own and others, to a
sum of nearly $l60,000. Their combined outlays were less than either Young
or William White deposed president of Central ^ent. Mew York Central's
deposed management spent more than a half million dollars.
A pr(»y fight costs mon^ because the management, at the outset, has
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all the advantages* The officers have the list of stockholders* They con-
trol> as the saying goes, the proocy oachinery* Th^ can send out letters
to shareholders extolling their oim virtures, pointing with pride to their
records, and detailing the compahy's long and successful histoiy* They can
describe the opposition as interlopers, txying to get covetous fingers in
the corporate till* And all this is done irith the funds of the corporation*
The Bianagement does not risk personal funds to stay in office - as the
challenger often does*
Horeover, investors do not want to be disturbed* They prefer the
status quo* Even in tl» Nev lork Central, the numerical majority vent
along vlth Ifhlte* The small stockholder did not want to make a change*
John 0* Rockefeller, Jr*, had the same experience la 1929 in his prosqr cam¬
paign to unseat Colonel Robert V* Stewart as president of Standard Oil Com¬
pany of Indiana again the small shareholders were apathetic* let, Rockefeller
campaigned on a moral issue* Stewart, called to testify in Senator Thomas
J* Walsh's famous investigator of the Teapot Dome scandal, refused to answer
questions about bonds which bad mysteriously changed hands* Rockefeller
felt that was unbecoming to and isproper for the chief executive of a major
industrial enterprise. Hence his determination, as a large shareholder, to
oust Stewart*
In the strt;^gle, he enlisted the services of Winthrop W* Aldrich,
one of New York's financial elite who later became head of the Chase National
Bank and still later U*S* Ambassador to Great Britain tukler Fresident
Eisenhower* Aldrich mobilized the support of the New York finarKslal commu¬
nity and through it was able to throw Stewart out* Some $300,000 was
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spent in getting proxies* In those days, that was a respectable sua.
Rockefeller controlled, personally and through the Rockefeller Foun¬
dation, 13 per cent of Indiana Standard's stock.
*In the Central fight, loung, through his oim holdings and those of
Murchison and Richards<m, owned 17 per cent of the shares of the Central*"^
The challengers for control of a corporation must not only be prepared to
spend money in a proxy campaign but he usually must hare a large stock in¬
terested*
Without a Young or a Rockefeller to make effectlTe the stockholders'
right to throw the ins out, the proxy is like a Coaimunist ballot* There
is only one slate to vote for* Nevertheless, the mere fact that the right
exists, that occasionally a Young or a Rockefeller arises and is successful,
is a boom to all shareholders in a political senset No management can be
conqplac^t* No management can feel entrenched in its emoluments*
The haunting throught vill rises It happ^ed In Standard Oil of
Indiana; It happened in New York Coitral* It might happen here* This
threat la a constant goad to pay dividends, to make the stock highly prized
in the market place - in short, to make it prohibitive to be challenged
successfully*
Eventually, though, the power to control management through the
ballot, as Bullls put It, Is limited* It takes a man with (1) mon^ aixl
(2) ambition to make a fight for control of a ccmipany* If he wins a proxy
contest, he must be prepared to manage the coiq)any or get someone to do so*
^"Hosr Young Got the Vote," Fortune Magazine, Vol. D (August, 19$h)»
pp. 87-88.
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Only when a challenger arisea can a shareholder esqpress approval or dis¬
approval of the management and so make his vote effective.
Shortly after World War U, an outburst of stockholders fights of
vhich the Central and Montgomery Ward made first paper headlines, gave news¬
paper columnists and other writers an opportxmlty to indulge in blatant
superficialities. "Stockholders have found their voices." "Stockholders
are asserting their rights." "Stockholders democracy has burst into flower."
The facts do not support such cliches.
Out of some three thousand companies whose stocks are traded in
America's fourteen registered stock exchanges, only thirty-two proxy con¬
tests occurred in fiscal 1961, of which twenty were contests for outright
control in other words, fights to the finish. The other twelve were for re¬
presentation on the board. That is minority stockholders wanted a "say" or
a "look-in" on managemeit.
Most proxy disputes do not make the national news, often th^ are
quiet, local affairs. "Among the contests in 1956 and 1957 were Hercules
Morton Corporation, Allied International Investory, Michigan Steel Tube
Products, Parkersburg Aetna Corporation, Reda Pua^, United Board & Canton,
Western Air Lines."^ Scxnetimes proxy fights take years to mature. In
1957, slxl opposition slate si^poarted by Robert R. loung and the Allegheny
Corporation sought representation on the board of directors of the Mssouri
Pacific Railroad in the cumulative voting slate of Missouri. One anti¬
management director was elected out of five. This could balloon later into'
a full-pledged fight for control.
^Louls Lois, Securities Regulation (New Torkt Little, Brown and
CoB^az^, 1962), p. 109.
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Often proxy contests are conpromised. A court decree settled the
bitter Fairbanks Morse light after Robert H» Morse> Jr., president and
Leopard D. Silberstein, who wanted to take over^ reached a stalemate* This
took the issue out of the hand of shareholders*^ They could not Tote* In
a dispute in Loev^s an SEC report makes this revealing bbservationt By
negotiation, opposition was given one place on the board; no opposition
solicitaticm was made* Again, a vote of stockholders was made unnecessary*
Corporate democracy is bypassed*
Obviously, shareholder voting muscles do not get much exercise*
Twelve to twen^-four fights a year out of more than three thousand elec*
tiotts conies to far less than one per cent* Essentially, the shareholder
vote is potent only when, as, and if the opportunity*~>the challenger arises,
which is not often*
Battle for the Centary,-»*On February 10, 195U, fifteen directors
of the New York Central Railroad Cos^any unanimously voted to decline
2
Robert R* Young's offer to become their chairman*" The next day. Young
declared war on these "poverful interests" in Wall Street, with whom, only
twenty-four hours before, he was prepared to associate*
Without beneAt of a Gallup, Roper, or University bf
Mchigan poll. Young announced he had the support of 90 per
cent of the Central's shareholders on the issue of whether
the owner of the properties shall prevail in management over




"Battle of Giantst Who'll Run the Great Central," Newsweek
Magazine, 7ol* XDIII (February 22, 195U}, PP* 78-79*
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Xoujig coneldered himself an "oimer.” The director vho chose to
resist his offer were "interlopers" and Included such established finan-
cers and businessmen as George Vhitnery, then chairman of J • P* Morgan
& Ccmpanyj Percy J« B^bott^ then president of the Chase National Bank^
now the Chase Manhattan; Lawrence N. Murray, president of the Mellon
National Bank & Trust Cooqpanyj Alexander C. Nogle, president of the First
National Bank, since merged into the First National City Bank of New York;
William £• leves, for maiy years president and later chairman of Owens-
Illinois Glass Cosqpany; Earle J* Machold, president of Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp*; James A* Farley, chairman of Coca-Cola Corporation, and an experi¬
enced political caiipaigner; Elton Hoyt, II, senior partner in Packard,
Mather & Compai^, Cleveland investment and management firm in iron ore,
coke & coal prcpertles. Young picked on no patsies when he began the
proxy battle for the century, the New York Central's prestige New York—to
Chicago passenger train and all the wealth, tradition, and power it stands
for.
Young's declaration of war came after he had told Harold S. Vander¬
bilt, largest stockholder in the Central board and great grandson of Commo¬
dore Cornelius Vanderbilt, grand old man of the Central, that he had been
acquirii^ Central stock alcaag with Allen P. Kihby, Young's longtime business
associate* He also confided to Vanderbilt that he and Eihby were liqui¬
dating their holdings in C & O Railroad; so was AUeghary Corporation, of
which Young was chairman and ELnby president* Such liquidation would leave
them free to serve as directors of Central and participate in the managonent*
Once before, in early 19U7, Young had made a bid for a say in Cen¬
tral* He controlled C & 0 through Alleghany* He had us^ C & 0 cash to
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bu7 enough Central stock to proo^t Gustov Metsman, the president of
Central, to offer bin two directorships—one for binself, or chairman of
C & 0, one for Robert Bowman, or C & 0 president* But in Maj, 191^8,
the ICC denied Young's application to serve on the Central board. The
C & 0 conqpeted with the Central* Young controlled the C & 0* Inter¬
locking control would stifle or ciurb coB^)etition* The ICC went further*
The C & O holdings of Central most be kept in an alreadjr established
voting trust with an ind^endent trustee* Young must not exercise his
voting poser; he must not select directors for Central* C & 0 could only
hold Central shares as a "Simon pure" Investment*
Young's interview with Vanderbilt took place in the cosqt environ¬
ment of Palm Beach where both bad homes* They also were neighbors at
Newport, Rhode Island* Young only wanted two seats on the board, he told
his socialite friend. But one of these seats was to include a newiy
created post of chairman of the board, and the chairman was to be chief
executive of the board* Young did not want to oust William White, presi¬
dent* White could continue as chief <^erating officer*
Indeed, Young later invited White to lunch at the plush
cloud Club atop the Chrysler Building, in New York, and
promised that if White remained on the job, he. White, would
be given an opportunity to buy Central stock at a fixed
price—and only if the stock went up.***
White turned down the proposal* "When some are asked whether they parted
friends. White answered, 'well, I didn't kiss the guy*'
The proxy ca]i^)algn, the strategy of both sides q^ckly unfolded*
White disclosed himself as the steady hard working railroad man efficient,
^"No Coaprcadse," Newsweek Magazine, Vol* IDUI (March 22, 1951i),
p* 79*
32
quiet, solid, decorous* When his public relations advisor advisedt
"prcffixLse the stockholder a dividend," the best White could muster vas a
suggestion that maybe in the next few years earnings would recover suf¬
ficiently to waxrairt a 12*00 dividend* He was the archetype of all Toung
called him a conservative banker*s man*
Young had fewer inhibitions* He recalled that in the twenties the
Central had paid dividends of $1*00 and $8*00 a share* He saw no reason
at all why the road, under him (Young), should not regain that glory* A
$10*00 a share dividend was entirely possible*
Hie tried to get a Vanderbilt on the board for old times' sake* Com^
modore Cornelius Vanderbilt had built the Central and battles with "Ihicle*
Daniel Drew, Jay Gould, and "Admiral" Jim Fish* But no Vanderbilt would
play* He did nominate a woman, Lila Bell Acheson Wallace, president of the
Federation of Women Shareholders in American Business*
Young discovered a retired New York Central engineer, who
owned 80 shares, and made him a candidate, st^posedly to
provide an employee point of view* And he named William P*
Feeley, president of the Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company,
because, in addition to his other qualifications, he was a
Catholic* When Mrs* Guss had urged White to name a woman
to his slate, he said that there was no vacancy on^the
board a matter of fact statement that was no vote*^
Young started out with only a slight advantage*
He and Kinby each owned 100,000 shares, or a total of
200,000* This was more than the Central board owned, but
1
"How Young Got the Votes," Fortune Magazine* Vol* D (August, 1951^} *
p* 88*
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it vas less than 3 per cent of the 6«l»77»UlO shares out-
staading* Victory depended on the decision of some 140,000
shareholders, the 'Aunt Janes^' as Young called the small
independent corporate oimers*^
Investment trusts. Insurance companies, pension funds did not hold
Central. Neither did banks in their investment and trust accounts. Its
dividend record had been too erratic. The only big block of stock was
that owned by the C & 0. Young could d^end on the favor of the C & 0
management. He had sold AUegbez^'s controlling stock in C & O to his
friend, Cyrus S. Eaton, and bad seen to it that Eaton got ensconced in the
command seat. But C & 0, under Interstate CC order, could not favor Young
with its votes.
Chase Manhattan Bank (then Chase National) was trustee of
the stock. It possessed voting power under an ICC order.
Young had hoped Chase would remain neutral and not vote the
stock. But when Ebbott of the Chase voted against Young's
"offer* to assume the Central chair. Young set his mind and
fizzancial resourcefulness on those 800,000 shares.^
John Brooks told the story in the New York magazine of how David
Baird, a friend of Youzig and a member of the New York Stock Exchange,
offered, during a talk at Palm Beach, to try to organize a syndicate to
buy the stock*
Youzig was delighted. But then, after two critical days,
during which Baird had nothing conclusive to report, he
began to get nervous. Central stock was churning arouzid on the
Stock Exchange in anticipation of the proxy fight; it had
^Ibid., p. 88.
2
"Fight for the New York Central," Business Week Magazine. Vol. DV
(March 6, 196U), p. 27.
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jtuqped from 20 to 25* If loong couldn't arrange to have the
C & O's block bought quickly^ Ita price might be so high that
no one would want to buy it»
On the third day« loung, still in Palm Beach> receiTed a call^,
an old friend of bis named Don H, Carter, who was a business representa¬
tive of Clint ¥• Murchison, the freewheeling Texas oil man and investor*
In the past, acting through Carter, Marehison bad found Xoung's promo¬
tions profitable to the extent of several million dollars* As Touhg
recalls it. Carter came to see him about another business matter, and
while they were in the middle of discussing it, the ball started rolling*
Toung, trying not to seem eager, asked Carter if he thought Murchison
might be interested in buying the stock* Carter said that perhaps, and
after telephoning to Murchison, reported to Young that Murchiscn did,
indeed, seem interested* Young then put in a call for Valter J* Tuoby,
president of C & 0 and Young's former subordinate there, asked him whether
C & 0 might care to sell its Central seat at a price higher than the
200.00 or so a share the cooqpany had paid for it* M^be, said Tuaby, if
the price was $26*00*
Young was now in the bidding position common to brokers in big deals*
The market price of Central stock was fluttering around 2U, and because of
the uncertainties of the proxy fight, it might roar or sink any moment* If
it soared, Ihirchison would not buy, and if it sank, the C & 0 would not
sell* Either way, the deal would be off* On Monday, the l5th. Central
stock had touched 26* Young began negotiating with Murchison by telephone*
Hie had reason to STXspect that Tuohy would come down to 25 and he pointed
out what a bargain the stock would be at that price* Murchison said the
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price vas all right* Be also said that he would need a partner aiui had
one ready in the person of Sid V. Bicbardson^ another Texan with a pen¬
chant for short-ending his given and enlarging his bank roll. But
neither of the Texans liked the idea of patting up all the cash* Xoung
thereupon undertook to raise the cash for them*
^Jhat followed is one of the strangest transaction in financial
legerdemain* The price came to $20,0004000* Allegheny Corp*, controlled
by Xoung, advanced $7,500,000 on an unsecured note* Einby, Xoung's asso¬
ciate, advanced $5,000,000 and a group of Cleveland banks advanced the
rest* This last loan was secured by the stock* Nor was that all. The
Texans had a "put" as option, to seel the Allegheny Corporation half their
stock at the purchase price* Moreover, Richardson had a s^arate agree¬
ment with Eihty whereby Einby would take the 200,000 he could not put to
Allegheny* Murchison's risk was on 200,000 shares* The only possible
loses, commented the New Xorker, "appeared to be Allegheny," which Xoung
dominated with 0*7 per cent of its common stock*
This was the grand coup of the proxy battle* "VThite pros^tly
charged skulduggery* He told his lawyers to argue that Xoung still domi¬
nated the C & 0* Therefore, if Xoung got the Central, he would be a two
railroad man, which flouted established ICC policy* But the ICC rules
the stock had been properly transferr^ to the Texans* It could be voted*
The transaction had its embazrassments for Xoung* He was using
other people's money and credit—Allegheny's, that is—as if it were other
people's money* When a newspaperman asked Xoung's office what interest
was being paid on the Murchison-Richardson note to Allegheny, the answers
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we are iiot saying at this time. Later, it was discovered to be per cent.
Allegheny was not loaded with cash. So, It, In torn, had to borrow to pay
the C & 0.
Nevertheless, the transaction revealed Young's wizardry. Doubtful
shareholders were now convinced that Young had the Nldas touch. He would
promote. could achieve his ends. Besides, he now had 1,000,000 shares
In hand ~ 16 per cent of the Central stock. In most coa^anies that was
control ~ working control.
The struggle for votes which followed proved that politicians know
their business, tlhlte knew what would appeal to bona fide Investors to
banks, Insxirance coa^anles, managers of trust funds, university endowment
funds. He made no bold pledges. He said that he was working hard to reduce
costs, to iitqprove the Central's properties and that ultimately he expected
to be able to pay small but regular dividends. In the 1920's, that pitch
would have paid off because the Central was an Investment stock. But in
19$kt approxiisateiy per cent of the shares were in brokers' names. They
were owned by speculators, readers > persons who were far more Interested
In an upward move In the market and the captive of a capital gain than In
tortoiselike progress though gradual Increauses in earnings and dividends.
Young was the hare. His proxy statement saldt Dear Fellow Shares
holder: Put us to work to make your stock more valuable. We have bought
stock with a present market value of 25,000,000 In the faith that we can.
Young then pointed out the timidity of White —- the best he hopes for Is
a "possible $2.00 dividend In four or five years or a little less. If this
had been our view we would not have acquired our shareholdings.
Young cited his own magic law the prices of securities of Allegheny
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Corporation, Nickel Plate, C & 0, Pere Marquette, Missouri Pacific, and
Pittston Compangr, bad advanced between 193^ 1953* ^be dates were con¬
venient. For 1938 was a depression year in stocks. 1953 vas a bull
market peak after tbe war. Fortune magazine editorialized on Young's con¬
venient timing. It also pointed out that in Nickel Plate tbe big gain
occturred after Mr. Young bad sold out. But Young's blaniboyant display of
statistics convinced maiiy shareholders.
Fortune's editcnrial was favorable to White, or rather so condemnatory
of Young, that the New York Central represented and distributed it to stock¬
holders without permissi<m. Fortune sued and won $7,000. White regarded
the money well spent, but was later to settle a lawsuit because of it.
White's can^aign was one of aloof ridicule. Young was a man of
promises unfulfilled. White called attention to Youiag's boasts and dreams
to "Train Z," long on the drawing board but never on the tracks; to C & O's
adoption and abandonment of a central ticket service; to Yoiing's purchase
of passenger ears in bulk and the subsequent sale of the cars to other roads
at a loss; to his Investment in the Qreenbrief Hotel at White Sulphur Springs,
whichWhite said was losing mon^; to Young's suggestion that the railroads
use refrigeration ears cooled mechanically Instead of with ice (White said
this was fantastically expensive).
White pointed out that in 19U2 Allegheny Cozporation
has owned 1,929,779 shares of C & 0 stock; that at the end
of 1952, it owned only 10U,85U shares. So Young controlled
C & 0 with ownership of 1.3 per cent of the stock, even as
he controlled Allegheny with less than 1 per cent of the
stock.^
^"Scramble For Votes Is On," Business Week Magazine. Vol. IV.
(April 3, 195U), p. 118.
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The Inference is that Toung talked owner^management hut he would sell out
after he got control If it served his purpose* Further, White pointed out
that Young and Kirby, as principal officers of AUeghei^ Corporation, which
at the time controlled Investors Diversified Services, Inc., had entered In¬
to a transaction with thooselves whereby iUegheny exchange stock of Inves¬
tors Diversified Services for Allegheny Series A preferred stock which they
owned out of this deal, said White* Young Kirby stood to make a profit of
more than |9«600,000* This statement was not challenged* It subsequently
was the basis for a lawsuit and for a SEC recomnendatlon to the ICC that
Allegheny Corporation be made subject to SEC regulations under Investment
G<MiQ>any Act* That act bars investment cosyjany officers from dealing with
themselves and affiliates without SEC permission* Th^ must prove arm's
length dealings*
Stockholders were inundated with literature* Each side sent out
seven mailings* The management hired Georgesen & Coo^any, largest firm of
professional proxy^ solitlcltors, to call up shareholders and to bring In
votes* Central employees also "yolunteered*" Young said that he would not
use professional stock solicitors but later hired the firm of Keisel and
Con^az^* White supplemented the New.York Coitral public relations staff
with Roblnson-Baimegan Associates to drum up pro-manag^ent sentiments
Young had his own public relations man, Thomas J* Deegan, Jr*, who sub¬
sequently became a vlce-presidsit of Central and, still later, resigned to
form his own firm with Central as a client.
From the start. Young enphaslzed that the management was using com¬
pany funds to pay the expenses of the proxy fight* The present board Is
not entitled to have unlimited access to the treasury* In an effort to
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maintain themselves as directors* Young announced he had commenced suit to
stop such e^qpenditures*
At the same time. Young & AUegbezqr Corporation, he, Eirh/, and
other candidates for the board vere spending their own BK>n^ and energies
in behalf of shareholders because ve have bought over a million shares of
Central stock in the full faith that under sound management it can again
sell far above the present price and pay far in excess of its present divl->
dends*
In the final svirl of proxy-getting. New York Central eiq)l^ees used
telephones and rang doorbells in behalf of the management* Clint W* Murchi¬
son, as controlling shareholder in Ic^old, Inc*, office equipment firm,
put its salesmen at the beck and call of Young* Also bankers and brokers,
who were actively associated with either side, tried to corral votes* One
Oklahoma friend of Murchison had received a list of shareholders in the
slate with the request to call them up and to bring them in on Young's side*
On May 26, a stockholder's special left the Grand
Central Station, New York City, for Albany* The train was
packed. Young's followers were buttons - Young at Heart,
when Young arrived he was greeted with cheers and made a
churchillian sign of triua^h* White came along a bit later*
He had a pipe in his mouthj photographers had to beseech
him for a picture*^
They asked him, too, for the victory sign* He made it, but, as the New
Yorker put it, "in a deprecatory, mechanical way*"
The rival walked through the train electioneering* They were only
two cars apart at Poughkeepsie* They were certain to meet in the aisles*
But the train stopped* White got off and took the second section*
^"Scramble For the Votes Is On*" Business Week Magazine, Vol* DX
(April 3, 195U), p. 120*
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The stockholders' session, held in the drill shed of the Washington
Arenue Amory, was mcn’e ritual than practical* The countiz^ of proxies
would take three weeks* Some shareholders, overwhelmed by attention, had
signed proxies of both sides with a sense of indiscriminate power* Only
the last-dated proxy would co\xat* But letters had to plow through the
mountains of forms and cancel all proxies which had been superdated.
"Flanking White on the platform were Harold S* Vanderbilt, William
H* Vanderbilt, James A* Farley« and several other directors — the largest
of Young's changes of old-guardlsm.The two men stockholders wanted
most to see, the Texans for whom Young raised the money to produce hisowa
coup, Murchison and Richardson, weren't there*
The show went on, though there could be no results that dsy* White
called the meeting to order* Mrs* Goes protested on a point of order*
Speeches were made* Many persona tried to speak at once* "Late in the
afternoon. Young announcedt Shareowners I'm happy to tell you — you have
won*" White protested the audacity and the presumptiousnesst By what
authority did Ihr* Young speak? But White knew Young was right*
White had been beaten because he was the kind of person he was, the
kind of person who could not conduct a cas^algn to appeal to speculations*
Young, on the other hand, had political power* He made his pitch to the
large group of traders and speculators who had bought Central for a market
advance, who had not even troubled to have the Central stock transferred*
They left the shares in brokers' name* The statistics bear this out.
Stock in brokers names went for Young by a two-to-one margin 1>372,
CXX) shares to 678,000 including the 200,000 shares owned by Young and Kirby*
^"Wheel-Deal in the Central," Time Magazine* Vol* DUII (March 8,
195U), P* 89*
Ihren eliaiinating these shares^ the nargin in favor of Young vas ten to six.
White got a majority fron stockholders vbo had registered the stock in
their own names. There are persons who might be described as long-term in¬
vestors — the Aunt Janes, whom Young vas "saving** but, the margin vas in¬
sufficient to overcome Young's advantage in street-name stock. White had
this moral satisfaction; individual stockholders voted for him nearly two
to one 23,033 versus 12,522.
Young did not live up to his campaign promises. At the shareholders*
meeting, he ostentatiously announced that he vas voting his personal shares
for cumulative voting. He did this to win the allegiance of Lewis D. Gilbert
and Hrs. Goss. But when Gilbert put this in the form of a proposal on the
Central proxy statement for 19$$, the board of directors voted unanimously
against.
Its adoption might invite some of the previous directorate and their
numerous and powerful allies to seek reinstatement with no other purpose
than to keep us from achieving our goals, thus justiiying their own unhappy
predictions of doom.
Young's fear vas fanciful. The former Central directors hadn't
enough stock to elect one of their number to the board. And thqr were un¬
likely to want to sit on Young's board. Further, to serve as a militant,
bickering minority would be contrary to their principle of management. As
heads of instltuticmis they believed in law, order, harmony and management
rule.
Again, on the matter of expenses, Yottng's past election performance
believed his pre-election knighthood. When he began soliciting proxies he
asked shareholders in big, black type this rhetrical questions Wby are ve
spending our ffione7 energies on your behalf?
Young went on to say that the cost of the proxy solicitation will
• ..borne by Allegehei^r Corporation and the fifteen
nominees on the basis of their average holdings of New
York Central stock. But after the battle was won^ he
submitted a bill for $l>30d,733»71 to New York Central
shareholders for approval > a con^lete repudiation of
his seeming promise.^
Alas, seeming it wasl He had a legal escape clause. In his letter to share¬
holders was this stencet Whether Allegheny and the nominees will seek ary
reimbursement from the Central will depend on the outcome of a lawsuit.
The lawsuit was to stop the Central management from using Central
funds to fight Young. Since, traditionally, corporation managements have
always used the corporation treasury to solicit proxies — it is part of the
cost of operating the business and Young's suit was unlikely to succeed.
Courts have upheld the right of management to spend corporation funds to keep
itself in office.
Argued Mr. Youngt
If the expenses of only one side are to be so borne,
it would seem not only more equitable, but more within the
wishes of shareholders, that it be the e^qpenses of the vic¬
tors. Consequently, your board has been persuaded, and we
believe rightly, that it would be a discouraging president
to owners of other non-owner director companies for xis to
defray our own expenses when the benefit rebound to all
Central shareholders, pro rata, Just as the expenses would
automatically be borne if the conpany defrayed them.^
Seem New York Central stockholders were confused. Originally, they
voted for Young because he showed a willingness to spend his own money; now
^J. Brooks, "Great Proxy Fight," New Yorker Magazinoa 7ol. XXX
(July 3, 195U), p. 28.
^Ibid.
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th^ could not make up their minda whether loung'a coiuem was hla own
pocketbook on some future unknown shareholders for whom he might be setting
a discouraging precedent* And this came out at the first annual meeting of
New York Central shareholders after Young's election* The New York Times
account of the meeting instructiveljr delineates the difference between
Young's practice and preachment in corporate democracy* Hr* Young refused
to entertain any question put to him that indicated the questioner was not
in full agreement with the entire Young program. He declared at least six
stockholders out of order for remarks or objections directed to the chair*
But the mass of shareholders were for Young. The resolution to re>
imburse was passed by a rote of Uj885^136 to 381i>8l2* The margin is not
quite so substantial as the aritlanetic* The total included about 1,000^000
shares which Young, Kirby, Allegheny, siid the Texans owned* But it again
proves the importance and ignorance of the rank and file shareholders, the
Aunt Janes*
Criticism was not confined to the New York Central family. life
magazine suggested that Young was guilty of shoddy ethics and morals in
iagjlying that he would not seek repayment. The Washington Post and the
Times Herald carried an editorial suggesting that such requests for reim¬
bursement of outlays in proxy battles should be carefully auditedt
This whole problem deserves the attention of the
average citizen as well as the stockholders* What is to
prevent a group of wealthy operations from recklessly
spending huge sums of money to gain control of a corpora¬
tion if th^ then are to be reimbursed by the corporation
and its stockholders? This possibility opens up a new
form of piracy* It is naive to say that the matter should
be left to the good Judgment of shareholders* It would be
possible^ of course, for New York Central stockholder,
properwarned and organized, to turn dom Young's
request. But it would be very difficult,^
Shareholders do what th^jc* managements suggest unless some strong
man, like Young, emerges to organize a contest against the management, A
group of adventurers, anxious to take over control of a company, would be
encouraged to spend freely. The more they gamble, the greater would be
their chance of getting votes and control, and, therefore reimbursement.
Half hearted spending might lead to defeat.
The New York Central fight esphasizes that proxy battles are not a
poor man's game. Young, as noted, was enthusiastically voted $1,308,000
by Central shareholders for his and Allegheny's outlays. White, according
to Young, spent $876,000. Ebwever, thanks to litigious shareholders who
sued Young and to Young who sued White and the old Central board of diree»
tors. New York Central did not have to ladle out all the cash. Young, the
newly chosen board of Central directors, and Allegheny Corporation settled
for $300,000 in a suit demanding a return of $1,308,000, That is at the
rate of 22.9 cents on the dollar. A suit against White and the old direc¬
tors for misuse of Central funds was settled for $125,000 or 1^.3 cents on
the dollar.
The settlement by White and Central directors runs counter to the
ccmcept that company officials have a right-way, a duty-to use corporate i
funds to keep themselves in office. In theory, the directors were selected
and elected by stockholders; in theory th^ selected and elected a president
to run the corporation. So, presumably, in their opinion he is a good mana¬
ger. Therefore, they ought to fight with all the cozporation's resources,
•^id.
a grab for control, a threat to oust bim.
Under such circumstances, would an ousted board of directors where
members included officials of J. P. Morgan & Co., the Chase Manhattan Bank,
numerous major corporations, and White, himself, pay off with their own
money a lawsuit if th^ were convinced they had fulfilled their duty? The
question is particularly pertinent, inasmuch as there never has been any
doubt about White's ability as a railroad man. Young, himself, asked White
to stay on as chief operating officer of the Central. And, after White was
out of Central, he became president of the Delaware & Hudson Company, a
railroad much smaller and less influential than Central, but better heeled
financially and far more profitable.
The answer is to be found in a court decision handed down on July 8,
1955* long after the Central proxy fight, but right in the middle of the
litigation over proxy expenses. A group of shareholders of Fairchild Engine
and Airplane Corporation had sued to recover from present and former offi¬
cers and directors payments by the company of expenses of both sides in a
bitter and costly proxy fight. The stockholders objected not only to the
reimbursement of expenses of the challenging group, which was successful
and took office, but also to the use of corporate funds by the defeated
management to keep itself in office. Even though the plaintiffs did not
succeed, the case ~ Rosenfield vs. Fairchild - could make history. The
ruling of the New York Court of Appeals, in allowing the payment of expenses,
was so close, four judges to three, that it raised doubts about the validity
of such payment under slightly modified circumstances. How would this
court. New York's highest, decide in another instance? The switch of one
jurist could change the law.
The minority of three Judges questioaed whether expenditures, aside
from sending out notices of the meeting, informing shareholders of the
issues, and paying proxy solicitors to alert stockholders to their voting
rights, were legal* Purely caii$>aign expenses of a management group do not
serve a corporate purpose* And one of the majority Judges indicated in a
separate opinion that if the plaintiff had demanded a particulatization of
expenditures, proper and improper, he might have ruled out some of the
managements outlays in its unsuccessful effort to stay in office. In that
case, the decision would have been four to three the other way*
Confronted with this Fairchild decision, the lawyers for the old
board of directors of Central were in a quandry* If they contested the
suit, the attorney for the suing stockholders would demand a bill of parti¬
culars, and the court might reverse itself four to three, and disallow some
of the outlays* Chie expenditure would certainly be questioned*
Sue the Directors*—No stockholder has the right to good management*
But he has the right to honest management* He can e:qpeet officers and
directors to watch over the business and property of his corporation as if
it were their own* Thus, Section U08 of the Pennsylvania Business Corpora¬
tion Law states: Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand a fiduci¬
ary relation to the corporation, and shall discharge the duties of their
respective positions in good faith and with that diligence, care, and skill
which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in
their personal business affairs*
The law grants officers and directors a vast latitude* They can make
mistakes* They can exercise and Judgment* They can lose money* Th^ can
refuse to pay dividends if they csm adduce a business reason for so doing*
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But th^ loust not abuse their powers and priTileges.
They must not be dishonest. TheT* must not make profits at the ex¬
pense of the corporation. The7 must not favor friends or relatives in
business dealings to the detriment of the business. They must not pursue
a dividend policy to their own ends. They must serve the stockholders and
not themselves.
If they fail to do, they can be sued. But a stockholder's suit is
not so easy as it used to be — nor as profitable. Vniich brings us to
Clarence A. Venner.
Venner died in 1933* Eleven years later - ia 19hh - Governor Thomas
£. Dew^, of New York signed a law which is a left-handed monument to
Venner's life and work. It is designed to make it more difficult for others
to do what Venner did so persistently.
The law provides that a stockholder who brings suit against officers
and directors of a corporation in New York must put up a bond to pay court
costs and the esqienses of the defendant directors and officers unless he
owns or represents $^0,000 worth, or 5 psr cent, of stock of aiy one class.
S\ibsequently, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, and other states adopted
similar statutes. In signing the New York bill. Governor Dewey said: "A
shareholder with a real grievance should have little trouble persuading
enough other stockholders to Join with him to meet one of these exen^tions."^
Nonetheless, the law makes it harder for stockholders to sue.
Venner was a member of the New York Stock Exchange and a man of
oystery. He died leaving an estate of $700,000 after having sued more
^H. Louners Rhenlanders, The Derivative Stockholders (New York*
little. Brown & Cco^jany, 1957)* p. 205.
co]:i}orate titans than any other non-lasyer. imong his court antagonists
were Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fs Railroad, Union Pacific Railroad, Pullman
Palace Car Company, United States Steel Corporation, J. P* Morgan and Com¬
pany, New York Central Railroad, Cbreat Nothem Railway, and its powerful
president, James J. Hill, the Wabash, Guaranty Trust Co., Bethlehem Steel,
New York life Insurance Co., AT & T, American Hide and Leather, and many
more. To Venner, the bigger the opponent, the more lucrative the triunqph.
He settled a suit against the Great Northern by selling Hill, the
doughty president and no purchases, 980 shares of stock for $5l3>000.
Venner had paid |188,^87 for the shares. He received |300,000 for bonds
with a face value of $30,000 by withdrawing a suit against the Union Paci¬
fic.
He was accused of selling for $250,000 'worthless*
stock in a paper railroad, the Nebraska Central, to the
Chicago, Rock Island &. Pacific Railway. Venner said he
had spent $175,000 in projecting the Nebraska Central and
it was profitable for the Rock Island to^pxirchase the
franchise even though it was never used.
The above facts about his triumph are not of Veimer's voluntary re¬
vealing. Kis own lawyer, in a suit to collect a fee, brought out the price
Hill paid for the Great Northern stock. "An ICC investigator gave evidence
in the Rock Island case at a government hearing."
"Venner was tall, heavy set, and always ioqpeccably dressed in e^qpen-
sively tailored clothes." He wore a stiff collar and his tie embellished
with a pearl stickpin. He carried his glasses in a handsome silver case.




His eyen-gray hair and muatache caxyed out the impression of a purposeful
man. Often he hid his identity as a litigant behind the Continental Secu¬
rities CoQ^>a^y« the General Inrestment Con^any and the Nev fork Central
Securities Corporation, which he controlled. These companies became known
among lawyers of the day as Venner's "alter-egos.*
When Venner was fighting American Ih.de & Leather Coo^any's plan of
reorganization, Lawrence Stem, a reporter on a New York paper persuaded
him to grant an interyiew.
Venner said concerning his case with the American Hide & Leather
Conyiany that on seyeral occasions he was rebuffed by officers of the com¬
pany, when he sought information to which, as a stockholder, he was entitled.
This became an issue in court. Vice Chancellor John Bentley of the Chanceiy
Court of New Jersey, ccmmented; It is true that Clarence H. Venner, in his
first few particular, met with many obstacles and some rebuffs at the hands
of the defendants officers. Some allcwances must be made, howeyer, for the
weakness of human nature. 1 can conceiye of no monster of the jungle that
could (so) unsettle the neryes of a coiporation director as the appearance
of Mr. Venner in search of information.
When the Interborough Rapid Transit Cco^any of New York, since m^ged
into the NYC subway system, was in financial difficulties, Venner, as a bond¬
holder, refused to go along with a reorganization plan approyed by 96 per
cent of the bondholders. He demanded the appointment of a receiyer. DeLancy
Necall, one of the numerous lawyers for the IBT, said in court: Venner
sits here on my right and has many times in court heard me expose his liti¬
gious life. Could anything be plainer than that his action either as a
stockholder, bondholder, or creditor is not for the benefit of his fellow
$0
bondholders, stockholders, and creditors but entlrelT* for hlnself? The
higher courts have held repeatedly that in such circumstances the court is
under no obligation to embarrass a company which is trying to smooth out
its affairs for the benefit of the stockholders and bondholders generally*
Later when 7enner offered to withdraw his request for a receiver in
the IBT case, the conqpany's counsel immediately told the court he was taken
by surprise* Venner was not withdrawing his motion at the request or sug¬
gestion of any person associated with 1ST* Counsel felt compelled to make
clear that Venner had not been bought off, that no deal had been made*
klhen Venner attempted to join in a suit already begun against the
General Baking Cos^ai^, the other plaintiffs withdrew* They said that they
did not want to be joint plaintiffs with him*
The following suit revealed Venner's siother, Krs* Setta Kills, de¬
manded that he return to her three thousands shares of Iowa Central Stock,
which he had borrowed in order to sue the railroad as a shareholder* If
the suit did not succeed, she said she was to get her shares back plus
$7^0.00 for their use* If the suit succeeded, Venner could bty her stock
under an option for $10,000.00.
"Venner's technique was to discover some legal flaw in a coiipany's
plan. He would txy to stop a merger, a reorganization, or a plan of action*
It would be more costly to hold up corporate plans to buy Venner out."^
There is one £q)ocryhal story: After he was well known as a bringer of
"Stock suits," he help up the plans of a large con5)any over a legalism, and
was Invited to talk things over with the board of directors* The board
^"Manage," Harpers Magazine, Vol. CDII (Hay, 1926), p* 52.
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listened to Venner, then asked him to retire briefly. When he returned,
the chairman said he vas authorized to offer Venner $10,000 for his stock -
a sum which would have yielded him a handsome profit. Venner stood up and
said: "Gentlemen, you forget that I have a reputation to uphold."
As the years went by, a common headline was, "Venner Sues New York
Central," or "Venner Against J. P. Morgan," or even more revealing, as
corporation found it necessary to contest his action, "Venner Loses Again."
Assessing Venner's work in behalf of stockholders is not easy.
August Belmont, the banker, called him a "practical blackmailer," Venner
started a suit for libel. But when Belmont confronted him with a demand
to take the stand and be examined, Vexmer dropped the action.
Supreme Court Justice James C. Van Siclen, of New York said:
No weight or venture can be added to the court's
memorandum by indulging in envertiness or branding the
plaintiff Venner ... If heretofore the judicial record
and published opinions of various state and federal coxurts
tend to establish that Venner is an antificer of litlga»
tion and a menace ^ corporate society, and added curse
will wash no cure.^
But too many small stockholders and opponents of big corporation, he
was a dealing and a protector. One of his admirers suggested a monument to
him at Broad and Wall Streets, saying:
Sacred to the Memory of Clarence Venner - the only man who ever made
money playing a line hard against the wizards of high finance. Instead,
his ^itaph is the law which curtails the rights of stockholders to sue.
Venner was called a nuisance, but he was also a legal Robin Hood, a
^"Manage," Harper's Magazine, Vol. CDII (May, 1926), p. 52.
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protector of the Ignoraat. By constantly challenging the proposals of com¬
panies, by demanding to have stock "appraised out" - as the expression Is -
In mergers, by examining every legal loophold, he kept cozporatlon officials
and Iwayers alert to their obligation to sec\irity owners. They had to ob¬
serve the letter as well as the spirit of their charter and by-lws, or
face Venner. He was like an auditing system in business, or a policeman on
a beat - a restraint on people who might be tempted. True, he would sell
his nightstick - at a price. But the mere fact that he wore a coat of mail,
often called black, produced higher corporate morality. He raised the level
of the corporate conscience. He made such a nuisance of himself that the
phrase "stock suit" is associated with his name. And laws to protect corpo¬
rations from stock suits have crystallized.
Today, in New York State - and many other states - a stockholder can¬
not bring suit against a corporation unless he owned stock at the time of
the alleged wrongdoing. The stockholder cannot buy into a suit, be a corpo¬
rate ambTilance chaser, or, to use the legal terminology, engage in champerty.
Furthermore, a stockholder who brings suit against officers and
directors today in defense of his and other stockholders' rights cannot
readily make a behind the scences settlement. In Federal courts, a proposed
settlement must be open, approved by a court, and stockholders are notified
before hand of the terms. In New York State, home of the biggest and most
ii!5)ortant stockholders suits, this procedure is almost invariably the prac¬
tice if not the rule. This is to prevent private dealing between manage¬
ment, on the one hand, and a particular stockholder or group of shareholders,
on the other, at the expense of the majority. States are moving toward
Judicially approved settlments as a necessary safeguard against Vennerisra.
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The z*ule in Pennsylvania is emphatic. An action bought on behalf of a
class shall not be dismissed, discontinued, or con^romlsed ••• without the
approval of the court in which the action is pending.
This protection for the great body of stockholders was implemented
in the famous case of Associated Gas &. Electric Cos^any vs. Greenberg.
Howard C. Hapson, president of A G & £, who later went to Jail, had engaged
in many practices that would hardly stand the searching examination of an
accountant. He became an easy man for a sharpshooting lawyers aiui stock¬
holders to bring a suit against him and he would buy yo\ir stock. And since
Associated Gas & Electric securities were dropping steadily in the past
1929 markets, it was profitable for a stockholder who had lost money in
A G & £ to bring a suit.
Adolph Greenberg and other shareholders settled out of court with
Hapson, receiving $9,000 of A G & £ funds for stock worth $51.88 in the
market. Later, when A G & £ went into receivership, the A G & £ trustee
sued for the difference and finally won in the Couort of Appeals in New York.
Justice Marian B. Dye held that when a stockholder brings suit in behalf
of the corporation and other stockholders, the £aao\mt secured is in behalf
of and for the account of the corporation. This is so because the action
belongs primary to it. The manner and method by which success is accos^llsh-
ed, whether by Judgment, settlement with court approval, or by disputation
of the parties, make no substantial different. The plaintiff stockholder,
in good conscience, should not be allowed to retain the proceeds of a
derivative suit discontinued by stipulation.
This is in keeping with the feeling of the SBC Act. Congress pro¬
vided that officers and directors who realize profits enacting in the
co]i^ai]7's stock held less than six months are liable to suit in behalf of
the corporation^ that is, all stockholders. It vas also a triun^h for
ethics. No longer could shareholders hope to bring a suit and, by private
settlement, make a profit.
But this vas not enough, corporation attorneys argued. There are
always lawyers with more time than practice, who will willingHy bring suit
purely on speculation. If they win, they collect a fat fee from the com¬
pany. If they lose, they have lost nothing but time, of which they seem
to have plenty.
So, New York, Pennsylvania, and other states have passed legislation
to make it difficult for lawyers to bring suits on a shoestring. Once,
again the legislation favour the large shareholders. As noted, a suing
shareholder in New York must be prepared to post a b(md to cover court
costs and expenses of the defendant unless he owns $^,000 worth, or $ per
cent, of the company's stock. In Pennsylvania, a suing shareholder may be
required to post security for costs unless he owns or has ;}oined with him
owners of 5 per cent of the cospany's outstanding stock. Amassing that
amount of stock in a company as large as the Pennsylvania Railroad, which
13,167>000 shares outstanding, tantamount to a prohibition. Pennsylvania
property laws are notable for their solicitors regard for the rights of
large property managers and owners.
The American bar splits into sections on anti-Venner laws. Lawyers
for corporations declare th^ are necessary to stop frivalous suits. Th^
contest, it is relatively easy for any attorney, or group of stockholders,
with a genuine cause of action to recruit $^0,000 or 5 psr cent, of stock
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in New York. But lawyers who bring "derivative suits" declare it is unde-
mocratic> penalizes the small shareholder, and stops many legitimate suits.
Some shareholders are Just not in a position to post a bond. California
tries to minimize the power of property by permitting a plaintiff to avoid
posting a bond if he can demonstrate to a court in a preliminary hearing
that he has a reasonable case and that the corpcaration and stockholders have
a reasonable chance of benefit from the suit. (But some lawyers argue that
if forces disclosure of their case to the defense before trial.)
These restrictions assumed that the large shareholders will not in¬
dulge in a frivalous suit. They impose financial tests on. the small share¬
holder, often the pawn of the lawyers who scents a wrong and will finance
court costs, knowing that if he wins he will collect a fee. The small
shareholder will seldcm, from bis own investigation of corporation affairs -
reading reports, stuc^ring the financial paper of newspaper - discover wrong¬
doing. Nor are the small shareholders' benefits in winning a suit Ukely
to be STifficient to warrant his being a principal litigant. It is trouble,
even if the lawyer does all the work.
Lawsuits, like proxy fights, are primarily the large stockholders'
game, or the lawyers' game. You have to be sophisticated to go into them.
You have to have a sufficient state to Justify the eff(n*t. And you caimot
hope, as a shareholder, to be directly reimbursed. Your lawyer will get a
fee, if you win, paid by the company.
All you get as the suing stockholder is your pro rata share of what¬
ever is collected from officers and directors. And this goes into the
corporate pot. You do not get a direct cash benefit unless it is later
paid out in dividends.
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Thus in pro27 fight^ as noted In lawsuits, the small stockholder is
protected by the large stockholder who is willing to fight. But this
happens haphazardly and only when it is in the direct interest of the large
shareholder, in a pro:cy fight, if he wants to take over control of the
cooqpai^, in a lawsuit, if he has a great deal to gain financially, and if
he is a lawyer looking for a substantial fee, "Lawsuits and proxy fights
out of pure righteousness are rarities."^
Relinquish One’s Own Stock.—Here is a natural question* If a stock¬
holder is not satisfied with a cou^any's management, why should he start a
proxy fight, why should he sue, why shouldn't he ;jxist sell his stock and
be done with it?
Answer* That is what roost stockholders do. It is the easiest, cheap¬
est, and, from many points of view, the roost practical wsy to express stock¬
holder dissatisfaction with a management, a conpany, or an industry.
The right to sell is a vote - it shows dissatisfaction. And the
stock market - Vail Street - is the polling booth. If the price of a stock
goes up, it registers stockholder - investor satisfaction. If it goes down,
it registers dissatisfaction in the market place.
Sewell L. Avery, as head of Montgomery Ward & Ccxipany, got his share
of market place votes both ways. "At the suggestion of J. P. Morgan & Co.,
Avery, a successful Chicago executive and head of U. S, Qsrpsun Ccaipaiy,
accepted the presidencey of Ward's in 1931> a year in which Ward's went
$8,700,000 in the red."^
University of Pennsylvania, Corporation and Civil Procedures,
(Philadelphia* University of Pennsylvania, Press, 194o), p. Sicf.
2
"Battle to Unseat Sewell Avery," Business Week Magazinej Vol, DV
(August 27, 195i*), p. 30*
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In 1939, the coBQsai^ reported a profit of $29,000,000
and its stock registered approval of Avery’s performance.
Frcm a low of 3^ in 1932, the common climbed to 57 3A n
1939» Avery now hailed as a master builder and executive.
But during World War II, Avery lost his constructive touch, and bis
favor with investors - shareholders. He. got into a brawl with the govern¬
ment over labor policy and was bodily carried out of his office in Chicago
by two soldiers when the U. S. Army seized the company to stop a strike.
Later, he had a series of difficulties with top executives who quit, first
in ones and twos, then often by the half dozen.
As a result. Sears Roebuck and Ccmqpany, Ward's principal rival in
the mail-order and chain-store business, made up for ground lost during the
thirties. Sear's sales, profits, and dividends expanded faster than Ward's.
The Wall Street voting machine duly registered the difference. By 1953,
Sears' stock sold higher than Ward's, ever though in 19ii5 Ward's common was
quoted $0% higher than Sears'.
This right to sell stock, to vote for or against a management in the
market place is different from a vote at a stockholder's meeting. When a
stockholder votes against a slate of directors, he is exercising his right
as a stockholder, or an owner. He hopes to change the management and to
improve the company. But a stockholder who sells say to hell with it. He
is not going to reform the conpany. He is not an owner trying to exercise
the value of his property. He says, in effect, "Include me out."
In one case, the shareholder controls his interest in the company.
In the other, he passes on his dissatisfaction to somebody else. The object
“Sbid., p. 32
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Is to get out of a stock while the price is stlU high. In this decision
to sell or not to seU, the large stockholder has distinct advantages. He
holds many shares. He is listened to by management. He has political in~
fluence in the con^any even though he is not represented on the board of
directors.
Thus, ;}ust before the Montgomery Ward stockholders' meeting in 19k9,
Sewell Avery held court. Large shareholders, representatives of banks and
investment t3nists could see him. Avery tried to impress upon them the
wisdom of his policies by unfolding a long-term chart which showed that after
the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and World War I, prices inevitably
fell. Avery e::q>ected prices to drop again. He was not going to expand dur¬
ing a boom. He was battering down Ward's hatches for a bust.
The point here is not whether Avery was right or wrong, but that he
gave large stockholders personal insight into his reasoning. Small share¬
holders seldom have the benefit of a personal meeting with the chief execu¬
tive of a major enterprise. They are handled by correspondence - remote
control.
On this same point, consider the experience of Russell McPhail.
"One day in August, 1953j he dropped into the offices of L, S, Starrett &
CoDpany, at Athol, Massachusetts, and indicated to the vice president and
the treasurer that he owned 10 per cent or more of the stock. The plush
carpet unrolled, Arthur H, Starrett, the president, who was away on vacation,
arranged to come back and meet McPhail."^
P* 35
^avid Karr, Fight for Control (New York: Ballantine Books, 1956),
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McPhail had some radical ideas • He wanted the compai^^ which was
paying $U,00 a share in dividends annually, to halve the rate. He also felt
that he ought to become a member of the board and an officer. S\ibsequently,
he met Starrett and Starrett who invited him to a meeting of the entire board
of directors to present his arguments for a change in dividend policy and
for his selection to the board.
Can you imagine a holder of ten or one hundred shares receiving such
elegant treatment?
McPhail, incidentally, used the same method in introducing himself
to officials of Transue St William Forging CQn^}a]:^. He was named vice chair¬
man of the board and chairman of the finance committee of Transue St Williams
at a salary of $lt6,000 a year later boasted to $61,000, As a large share¬
holder, he got a direct voice in management and became the highest paid
officers.
The Starrett board did not accept McPhail's views, did not name him
to the board of directors, did not give him a top level job. But he got his
hearing.
And later, he went to court to demand a stockholder's list so he could
comminicate with other stockholders. He did not get it. A Massachusetts
court decided that he wanted access to the stock transfer books in order to
persuade shareholder to sell him their stock or enlist their aid in getting
a paid voice in management and not for a proper corporate purpose.
A North Carolina bom rebel, domiciled in his spare time in a 56
boat, six-bed boat off Florida and with a candy business in New York City,
McPhail was stubbornly undiscouraged. He was firmly determined to make the
Massachusetts Yankees treat with him. Periodically, he conferred with
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Starrett, the elderly president of the family-run tool enterprise, a man as
stubborn as KcPhail, and determined not to let a Southerner upstart run his
con^any*
Starrett fathered a ten-year installment plan to sell twenty thou¬
sand shares of stock to loyal emplpyees. This was about enough stock to
offset HcPhail's holdings.
HcPhail wanted no part of the plan. The employees' stock might be
used against him in a proxy contest. He managed to get hold of a stock¬
holder's list - to fight the plan. When stockholders supported Starrett,
McPhail went to court - this time to Federal Court. The plan was unusual.
As soon as employees subscribed to shares, they obtained full voting and
dividend rights. In most installment purchase arrangements, voting di-d.dend
rights either are held in suspense until en^loyees own stock outright on
their rights accrue as the stock is paid for.
Under the Starrett plan, if the stock was selling for $60 a share,
an employee would have to put up only $6 of his own money in the first year.
He could then not only vote the stock in a proxy contest,but also would be
entitled to full dividends, which at the recent rates of $3 & year, would
yield $0 per cent or his initial investment. The dividends would be applied
to the purchase price of the stock. Of course, as the enployee's equity in
the stock increased, this would be reduced. For the first five years, the
plan required an employee to pay 10 per cent a year on the purchase price.
But at the end of five years, once an emplpyee had put up 50 per cent of his
own money, dividends might be counted as part of his 10 per cent annual pay¬
ment. Thus, the actual purchase of the stock would not take a full ten
years
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The Federal Court held up action on the plan for about two years,
notwithstanding the approval of shareholders on three different occasions,
first, when the plan was originally submitted and twice when amendments were
offered to the proposal. Informally, the Federal judge suggested that the
issue might be settled by inviting McPhail to become a member of the board.
But Starrett would have no dilution of the Yankee strain in his conpany.
The full board of directors turned down that suggestion in October, 1957.
Ultimately, the plan went through. The court decided that a program
to help keep employees become stockholders was normal and proper, but more
than that, even if it were designed, as McPhail claimed, to counterbalance
his holdings in favor of the incumbent managment, it served the laudable
purpose of frustrating a raid by him on the Investment of other stockholders.
McPhail later became embroiled with the SEC. He was accused of
making a personal profit "exceeding $lUi,000'' by manipulating the assets of
the McPhail Candy Corporation on investment trust which he controlled. Ac¬
cording to the SEC, he took over from the candy CQR;>any l6,l;00 shares of
Starrett and U,000 shares of Transue & Williams at original acquisition cost
after these stocks had gone up in price. The SEC settled the case after
McPhail made restitution by biying out stockholders of the candy con^any
and dissolving it or on Investment trust.
McPhail continued to acquire stock in Starrett coiqpany after his
SEC trouble, and in I96I reported ownership of 136,300 shares, or about
21.5 per cent of the outstanding stock. Thus, he continued to be a threat
to the Starrett management.
McPhail is a typical stockholder. He is not so much an investor or
a contester for power, with the financial resources to pay lawyers to get
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him what he vants* He has used his stock ownership in Transue & Williams
to obtain the highest pay in the cceipany as chairman of the board of direc¬
tors and chairman of the finance committee. He tried to use similar leyer-
age at Starrett and was resisted. McPhail is not a chaitpion of stockholders
in general with a capital C. He has used the rights of stockholders vis-a-
vis management. Just the opposite - according to U. S. Court of Appeals
Judge Peter Woodbury.
As the longest holder in Starrett, McPhail consoled himself, saying:
Everytime Starrett increases the dividend, X can btiy more stock. And if he
doesn't make money and the stock drops in price, that suits me too. I can
acciuimlate more at lower prices. Stockholders in Transue & Williams could
not suffer quite so abstractly wl^n Transue stock was delisted from the New
York Stock Exchange aiui shifted to the less prestigious American Stock Ex¬
change.
Why? Because earnings \mder McPhail's leadership had dwindled below
the New York Stock Exchange's minimum requirements.
McPhails* long tenure at Transue & Williams, notwithstanding his
misadventure with the SEC and Judge Woodburg's belittling comment about his
managerial desirability, is a ccmmentary on the pcwerlessness and inertia
of stockholders in maxe. When Harold 0. Barker, Transue &, Williams chair¬
man, bucked McPhail in a proxy contest in 1953, he lost.
It's unfortunate that the SEC action and Judge Woodbury's commits
both came two months after the proxy contest was decided. But it's question¬
able whether earlier disclosure would have made a difference, considering
McPhail'a continuance in power since. He had the winning votes in his port¬
folio
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Because they have easy access to the top management, most large
stockholders, and particulatly, institutional investors, banks, trust, in¬
surance companies, and pension funds, seldcm participate in prosy fights,
seldom have representatives make speeches at stockholders' meetings, seldcmi
make proposals in proxies for the consideration of other shareholders*
They achieve their ends through direct consultation* And if th^
feel that the management is \mconstructive or umriUing to listen to their
ideas, they sell - they divert themselves of their rights as shareholders -
and look around for another investment risk for their money* They act
strictly as investors handling other people's money* They do not assume the
role of champions of stockholders' rights.
Sometimes small stockholders are afflicted with attachment - loyalty -
in their decisions to sell or not to sell* Maybe they bave acquired stock
through legacy* ^ husband bought this stock* He had a reason for wanting
me to have it* Or maybe the shareholder has held shares for many years and
has the attitude: "The stock's treated me well. I'll stick by the con^any,
American Telephone and Telegraph Ccm^at^, which has ccme to be known as the
'widows' and 'orphans' stock," has built up a huge following of loyal in¬
vestors* And it has earned it by its consistent earnings and dividend per¬
formance.
An emotional and unbusinesslike approach seldom hangers the large
investor - the bank, the investment trust, the pension fund* To the insti¬
tution, investment is cold, hard, and matter of fact* Is the conqpany doing
well? Is the management good? Is the industry prosp^otis? If these cri¬
teria and satisfied, the stock is bought or retained. If not, it is sold*
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All investors, once they tear themselves loose from emotions, apply
similar criteria in sell or hold decisions. But the large stockholder is
in a far better position to make a wise decision than the small investor.
Investing is a full-time Job for him or his agent. He has a staff which is
constantly studying the merits of the individual cco^anies and securities.
Still further, the best investment brains among banks and brokerage firms
are constantly at the service of the large security holder - individual or
institutional - seeking commissions and other business. If atything, the
large stockholder is surfected with counsel. Hie not <mly must oiake a choice
of secTirities but a choice of advice in the securities.
The small investor, as observed, is a part-time investor at best.
His income from securities relative to total income, is small. ffl.s primary
economic interest is in his Job or profession. Heading annual report or
-praxj notices is a chore. Ccmununication from management go unopened.
Therefore, his right as a shareholder tend to atrophy, to be unused.
He is a victim of his om indifference and Innocence. And he cannot count
on the sophisticated investor to fight for him and his rights.
When it comes to controlling management, the interest of the great
mass of small shareholders is at various with that of the institutional in¬
vestor who wants only "out" when things look bad. It was no accident that
in the New York Central pro!xy fight investment trusts, insurance companies,
pension funds, and other institutions held little stock. Central stock did
not possess investment quality. The stock fell to a price low enough for
Robert R. Young to buy up a large block of it and fight for control. The
market place voted against Central as an investment stock. And in the sub¬
sequent proxy contest, the decisive votes were in the market place.
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The sophisticated investor takes this viewt "Life is too short."
If something goes wrong with a conqpany of a management, I will sell. I am
not a reformer, a champion of stockholders' rights. There are plenty of
stock and companies and Industries to choose from. Vly tie up monoy and
time in a managerial problem?
And so it is that the market place, the price stock, often is a
falling place. If a stock persistently cliches while other stock in the
same industry rise; then it is reasonable to conclude that the smart in¬
vestor - the insiders - are getting out, unloading is the term.... Ulti¬
mately, the stock may get low enough for some self-serving knight in finan¬
cial to buy it up and try to take over, a Robert R. Young, a Louis £.
Wolfsen. In serving himself, such a knight serves the stockholders who re¬
mained holding and holding and holding.
Thus, the market place vote has power. It is a positive warning,
a financial warning, to an incumbent management, of stockholder dissatisfac¬
tion has got beyond the discussion stage. The "big boys" are selling. So,
the management might bestir itself, make changes to strengthen the company's
position. For that reason, selling stock is not an entirely empty gesture.
True, the big investors do not fight for a change^ they do not stay with
the company that is retrogressing. But their leave taking has an effect.
CHAPTER III
THE CHANGING ROLE OF MANAGEMENT
Managements' Role In the Light of Acquisition Techniques
The Nurture of Stockholders.—-A corporation is not a lonely hearts
society. The president and the other top officers are not chosen for their
ability to entertain shareholders. They have risen to five and six-digit
salaries and comforting fringe benefits because they have demonstrated a
capacity to make mon^«
Whether by accident, e:q>erience, in systematic evaluation, top men
in any corporation are likely to allocate their time and energies to:
1, Customers and prospective customers
2, Products including research
3, Workers - good, health industrial relations (human relations)
I4. Supplies - especially in a seller's market, when materials
are scarce
5* Communities - being a good corporate citizen and an excellent
neighbor (corporate image)
Finally comes the stockholder. The executive works for them, but
only a small part of his energy is directed in this direction. This does
not conform to the myth of "shareholder democracy," in which the share¬
holder is the boss, the officers his hirelings.
It does not fit the literature that corporation, themselves see fit
to disseminate. Thus, the Pacific Gas and Electric Ccmipany sends a letter
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to a fonsier shareholder, saying: "Ve regret that you have ceased to be a
partner in this enterprise.” The word “partner,” is a euphemism. More
correct and straight forward would be: ”We regret you ceased to be an in¬
vestor in the enterprise.” But it is part of the tendency to cultivate
shareholders - past, present, and future. It cosies under the board and all
encos^assing heading: “Shareholder relations.”
Good managements look ahead. When dividends are highest and pro¬
spects brightest, trouble may be just around the corner. Trouble to a cor¬
poration executive is reduced sales, earnings, and dividends. At that stage,
good stockholder relations can be an asset.
The stock will be low, making large-scale accumulation possible.
And stockholders will be disgruntled, and, therefore, susceptible to pro¬
mises. This would be the time for a Wolfson or a Young to launch a fight
for Central. Stockholder loyalty to the management would becme critical.
The New York Central Railroad fight is illustrative. New York Cen¬
tral had not neglected its shareholders. But it had not cultivated share¬
holders either. Neither WLUiam White, who lost to Young, nor Gustav
Metzman, his predecessor, was particularly interested in shareholders. They
were railroad men, executives, not politicans. Neither was hail-fellow-well-
met, anxious to turn a central shareholder's meeting into a great big party
of common owners of a business, nor interested in uniting letter to share¬
holder. To them, the annual meeting was a chance something to be handled
with dispatch.
Central did not send out letters welcoming new shareholders, as many
companies did. It did not send out “regret” letters when stockholders sold
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stock*
Good stockholders relations are useful in three ways,
1* In proxy battle as in the Central case*
2* If the company sells consumer goods and wants its share¬
holders to be customers and boosts.
3* If it (the con5)any) wants to raise capital - new money.
con^anies have relations with shareholders when th^ send out
dividend checks^ annual reports, and requests for power. Doing these tasks
with finesse, flourish, and schmaltz make stockholders relations in capital
letters.
General Electric Ccmpai^y converts stockholder relations into "public
relations." G. E. sells refrigerators, washing machines, coffee makers,
television sets, electric stoves, oil burner, as well as heavy equipment for
power plant. And 375>000 shareholders are worth cultivating. They are upper
income people; therefore, likely customers for G. E* household products.
Hence, they are molders of consumer attitudes. They will influence others!
Suppose one has just bought a share of G. E. stock. Shortly, he will
receive a letter, signed by the president, welcoming him "on becoming a
share owner." The letters say that the conqpany "atteiq>ts to keep the share
owners not merely fully informed, but informed in a way that you will find
stimulating and interesting.
Then the new comer is told that the annual meeting, held in Schenec¬
tady, New York, the third Tuesday in April, affords an "opportunity" to gain
first-hand impression of the con5)any in operation. If you cannot come, the
seller informs you that a report of the meeting will be sent to you. Stock¬
holders also receive the annual report, and with each dividend check a spe¬
cial share owner quarterly.
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The next to last paragraph of the welcome letter exercises the hope
that "you will come to feel that you are indeed a member of the General
Electric family, conversant with its problems, proud of its contribution to
our national economy, a user and avocate of its products."
A month before the annual meeting a letter addressed "Dear Fellcw
Shareholder" goes out over the president's signature, "once again I am
pleased to invite you to our anntial meeting.
A post-meeting report con^letes General Electrics stockholder rela¬
tions routine. The covers shows (1) a massive picture of the meeting, cloak
full of shareholders, (2) coordinators chatting informally (there is always
an informal picture) with one of the couqiary's shareholders, (3) a view of
a GE kitchen.
The Scott Paper Compaiy follows a like procedure - with this addition.
It mails a package of its products - Scotkins, Cutrite was paper, Scotties,
kitchen towels with holder, bathroom towels, and three types of toilet paper
—Waldorf, Scott, and Soft Weve — to new shareholders.
Surveys by A. Weston Smith for the Financial World trail the growth
of loving care of corporations for shareholders back to 195l« "In that
year, only 12 per cent of one thousand large corporations when Smith ques-
tionnaired sent special invitations to shareholders to attend annual meet¬
ings."^ The proportion was 19 per cent in 1961^, and 29 per cent in 1956.
The feeling of shareholders has also boomed, but not without the
_
A. Weston Smith, "Stockholder Relations," Financial World, Vol. DX
(February, 1961), p. 3I4.
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liabilities. James M. Symes lost a large part of his audience at the new
Sheraton Hotel in Philadelphia^ when he announced that a lunch would be
served in a near-by room Immediately after the meeting. The shareholders
believed in the breadline adage: First come, first seznred. At a C & 0
Railway meeting, according to the Wall Street Journal, 80$ of the 3>000
shareholders present stanqpeded for a box lunch and a two hour free boat
ride ten minutes before adjournment. Duplan Corporation, which shortly
after the war fitted shareholders with large profits and banquets, has eli¬
minated the banquets or non-empathetic with low profits of the fifties.
And Stix-Baen & Fuller, St. Louis department store, dispenses with coffee
and sweet rolls after some stockholders grambled about the unnecessary ex¬
pense.
Some stockholders attend meeting with tote bags as evidence of their
deep proprietory interest. They take the meeting home with them in the form
of schedules and other memoranda. Just like citizens at a National Park or
on a battleship. They own the place, well, don't they?
AT&T has introduced a new touch. If officers notice that a par¬
ticular shareholder has been adding to his holdings year after year, a
letter signed by the president will be sent thanking him for his confidence
in the company. Also trained personnel of the company will visit share¬
holders, selected pretty much at random, to obtain their views as shareholders.
These interviewers are in search of knowledge and are not trying to "sell
the company,"
The regional meeting was an innovation of CSeneral Mills in 1939, If
the stockholder could not go the coii5)any, the conqpany's officers would go to
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the stockholder. In 19$hf the company held eight such meetings from coast
to coast.
Regional meetings are more useful to consumer goods companies than
to manufacturers of hea'vy machinery. They can be utilized as genteel-in-
the-family sales vhoop-de-doos. Of coxarse, such meetings can serve dual
purposes. Executives can talk to distributors^ dealers^ and large cvistomers
as well as shareholders as they travel about.
CHAPTER 17
CONCLUSION
You have often read that this is the land of "peoples capitalism" so
marqr persons are the legal owners of industrial corporations, public utili¬
ties, mines, railroads, and banks through possession of shares in major com¬
panies. You have read that women are the majority owners of our enterprises-
more women own stock than men. And so, we are told never to underestimate
the financial power of the female.
But neither, it must be said in a quiet aside, should we over¬
estimate women. Hen run our corporations and not too many men, at that.
They are the chairman of the boards and the presidents and the vice presi¬
dents. They control and manipulate the wealth. They are the hxisbands, or
the brothers, or sons who buy, sell, and send in the proxies, for stock in
their wives', sisters', or mothers' names. They are the trustees at banks
who administer the estates of widows and orphans. They are the e^qierts in
investment banking counsel firms and in the brokerage offices who suggest
to widows and single women how to manage their securities. The fiction that
women control most of the wealth of America is chivalrous and useful. It
makes women feel iu^ortant and it serves the ends of men.
I have endeavored to go behind The Folklore of Capitalism, to use
the title of Thurman Arnold's penetrating book. It examined the stockholder
as a reality and not as a New York Stock Exchange slogan. Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
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a lawyer, and Gardiner C, Means, an economist, tore astsY the folklore of
corporate ownership in the Modem Corporation and Private Property. They
pointed out how great aggregates of men, machinezy, materials, and money
had been "captured" by a few controlling officers and directors of corpora¬
tions. They wrote*
It is precisely this separation of control from owner¬
ship which makes possible tremendous aggregations of property.
The Fords and the Mellons, whose personal wealth is stiffi-
cient to finance great enterprises, are so few, that they
only emphasize the dependence of the large enterprise on the
wealth of th» many. The quasi-public corporation commands
its supply from ... the 'investing public.*^
Berle and Means documented the separation of control and legal owner¬
ship statistically and examined its sociological implications. After Berle
and Means, James Burnham published The Managerial Revolution, in which he
developed the theory of a new ruling class the managers, the industrialist,
who have a "special degree of control over — the instruments of production,"
and, thereby, obtain power and preference in our social order.
The managers of corporations control the proxy machinery, the ballot,
even as a politician dominates a ward, a county, or a city. Stockholders
plainly return the directors and presidents to office year after year for
their good deed the payment of dividends. These managers molligy their per¬
sonal and psychic needs with excellent salaries, nice bonuses, stock options,
and liberal expense accounts. Thqy have perfected financial devices to de¬
feat graduates income taxes, as befits the corporate elite, a managerial
class. Further, through their control of men, machinery, materials, and
money the corporate organization these managers exert great power in American
^Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modera Corporation and
Private Property (New York* The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 5»
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affairs —■ politics^ society, and business*
The stockholder gets the last bite on the apple core. Executives,
in administering the affairs of the comparer, look to the perpetuation of
the enterprise* Th^ are more Immediately concerned with maintaining "sound
relationships" with customers, suppliers, workers, the government and com¬
munity than with shareholders whom they dangle on proxy strings* And so,
it becomes Insistently in^ortant for those whom investing is a business -
the institutional Investor, the professionals - to see that officers and
directors do not, in their zeal to perpetuate the corporation as an insti¬
tution, slight the shareholders financially, and more significantly, morally.
Today the corporation has an identity distinct from its owners* I
can offer no stronger evidence than Peter Drucker’s book the Concept of the
Corporation* For his book, Drucker used General Motors as the very model
of a ma^or corporation*
Yet, the word "dividend" is not in the index* Nor, for that matter
is the word "stockholder." But you will find "worker," "Labor unions,"
"taxation," "public relations," "consiaaer*" You find a reference to "pro¬
fit, division of," and behold, it relates to the division of "gains from
increased efficiency between wages and profits." Worry about the stockholder?
Hardly* The persnickety problem is how much to let the union have; how much
to keep for the corporation.
This is by no means a criticism of Drucker* He was defining, ana¬
lyzing, characterizing the corporation as it is ... and as he found it* He
was dealing with priorities ••• realities. In the social reality the cor¬
poration is permanent and the shareholder is transitory*
75
Where, then, does this leave tlie shareholder? Frank W. Abrains,
former chairman of Standard (Mil (New Jersey), says corporations can achieve
their greatest social usefulness when management succeeds in finding har¬
monious balance among the claims of the stockholders, en^loyees, customers,
and public at large. But managem^t's responsibility, in the broadest sense
(is to be) a good citizen.
A good citizen. The corporation now has a new identity apart from
that of profit making, apart from its charter, by-laws, and legal trappings,
apa3rt from its shareholders. A Good Citizen, Inc. and the corporation execu¬
tives comports himself to reflect that corporate citizenship. He wears his
church clothes every day, not just on Sundays. In his paneled office, in
his travels about the country, in his community relations, he represents,
not himself, but the Corporation.
The shareholder is the residuary beneficiary of Good Citizen, Inc.,
and this gives rise to two-toned morality-one set of morals with which
executives, corporations, greet the outside world, and another set of morals
with which they treat shareholders. After all, the shareholders are transi¬
tory J
The modern corporation is an island of power, a financial stronghold.
Ambitioxxs, wealth-minded men compete for top jobs in these economic fortress.
Sometimes this competition for power emerges as a proxy fight, which offers
shareholders a chance to take sides. Sometimes a purposeful stockholder,
sensing some overreaching, some dishonesty, will sue. And sometimes, the
SBC may intervene - call a manager to account for violation of the law on
custom; suspended careless or misguided C.P.A.'s from practicing before it.
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Historically out of the common lair in Great Britain the stockholder
has always had a bundle of rights, of protection frcaa thievery, dishonesty,
and double-dealing. But the bundle was tied together with irubber hands
which could be skillfully stretched by ingenious executive and distinguished
lawyers.
The 1933 Securities Act required issues of stocks and bonds to tell
the truth. It was followed by the SBC Act of 193ht the Public Utility Hold¬
ing Ccanpany Act of 193U> and laws on investment companies, investment advisers,
and the re-organization of cooq>anies in bankruptcy. The SBC became the
policeman of Wall Street. It determined the adequacy of information, rejected
ambiguous statements, and denied sellers of securities the privilege of rosy
futuristic forecast. The SBC formulated rules to help the stockholder help
himself, and so fathered the new phrase, "corporate democracy."
"In its own way, the phrase is as misleading as people's democracy."
It suggests a militancy among shareholder that does not exist.^ It ia^lies
that the shareholder exercises his legal power, and defends his own right.
A few shareholders — the large ones or let us say the aggressive ones — do.
But for the most part shareholders are scattered, unorganized, and indiffer¬
ent. The managers are free to act quickly and discreetly, without benefit
of town meeting. This suggest that ours is a plutocratic corporate system.
Corporate democracy differs from political democracy. In a public
election to buy votes is a crime. In a proxy fight, plutocratic vote-getting
not only is legitimate but frequently is necessary to win a key control.
i
Frank D. Emerson and Franklin C. Hatcham, S^reholder Democracy
(Cleveland, Ohio* Western Reserve University Press, 1954}» P» 10ti»
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The SEC keeps their coiporate plutocrac7 under control through rules
and regulations. The accountants, lawyers, corporate controllers, and
secretaries, and investment bankers and brokers who constantly lay bare their
financial lives before the SEC create a f2’amework, on environment of right¬
ness, An outside convenience has become part of Wall Street in that Wall
Street has developed a new conscience of its own. Because of the penalties
attached to misbehavior, corporate officials have beccme solicitors of the
right of stockholders. Thus, the mass of stockholders has become an insti¬
tution force in America and not of what the individual stockholder does in
his own behalf, but because of what others do for him as a class.
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